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ABSTRACT 
Information asymmetry is a critical element in today’s financial markets. While 
asymmetric information related to directional information trading has been extensively studied in 
the existing literature, there is limited research and evidence on how volatility information 
trading impacts the options market. This dissertation studies, both theoretically and empirically, 
the behaviors of volatility information traders in options markets and the implications of their 
behaviors on information asymmetry and options pricing. 
I develop a model in which investors can trade multiple option contracts with varying 
strikes under an asymmetric framework. I show that volatility information trading is more likely 
to occur in Out of The Money (OTM) options if the overall presence of informed traders is low 
or if the relative liquidity in OTM options is better than At The Money (ATM) options. 
Moreover, I show that due to the variation in implicit leverage embedded in the option contracts, 
the OTM option contract contains a higher volatility information risk than the ATM option 
contract in equilibrium. In addition, I show that this volatility information risk differential plays a 
central role in forming the spread structure within an option series with the same underlying 
asset. Finally, I show that the shape of implied volatility skew (smile) is jointly determined by 
 volatility uncertainty and heterogeneous information risk across the option contracts. 
I empirically examine the implications of my theory using US equity options data, 
including two intra-day trade and quote datasets from the Chicago Board Option Exchange 
(CBOE). I estimate the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN) variable 
to measure the volatility information risk in the option market. I show that OTM contracts, on 
average, have a higher probability of information trading than ATM contracts. I also document 
that volatility risk explains a considerable proportion of the spread variations in the US equity 
options market. Finally, I provide evidence that the difference in information asymmetry across 
strike prices not only helps to explain the dynamics of implied volatility skew but also has a 
significant impact on the degree to which a change in historical volatility affects the shape of the 
implied volatility skew. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
The role of information asymmetry in financial market has always been an interesting 
topic for both academics and practitioners. The existence of a group of investors who possesses 
informational advantage is proven to have significant impact on the trading environment, market 
efficiency, as well as asset prices. However, while traditionally directional information trading—
investors who trade on private information about whether the price of an asset will move up or 
down—has been the primary concerns of market participants; the more diverse evolution of 
financial markets has made it increasingly important to understand the impact of information 
trading associated with another dimension of price movement—volatility information trading. 
Unlike directional informed traders (who have a number of alternative markets to invest in such 
as stock and futures markets), informed investors who trade in the volatility of underlying assets 
use only the option markets. Over the years, many articles in the press as well as in the existing 
literature have discussed the scope and significance of volatility trading in option markets. For 
example, Natenberg (1990) discusses why the primary concern of many option traders is the 
volatility of the underlying asset. Additionally, Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008) provide several 
quotes from the media that attribute significant option market activity to volatility trading.  
The existence of volatility traders has expanded the role of the option market from a 
purely derivative market, where investors trade for purposes such as hedging activities, to an 
independent trading vehicle that allows investors to acquire exposure to the volatility of 
underlying assets through positions in option contracts. There has been increasing recognition of 
the importance of understanding volatility information trading. Not only because volatility is an 
essential factor in traditional option pricing theories, it has also become a new motivation for 
options trading. Moreover, an in-depth understanding of the role of volatility trading can add to 
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our knowledge of option pricing features as well as the market microstructure of option markets.  
The notion of an informed volatility trader might refer to any volatility investors in the 
option market who either know, or are able to better predict the realization of the future volatility 
of assets based on their private resources. They can take advantage of this private information by 
trading option securities to earn abnormal profits. In fact, private volatility information may exist 
independent of inside information about the directional movement of an asset.1 Recent empirical 
work by Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008) finds that their non-market maker’s net demand derived 
from option trading volume can predict the future realized volatility—a clear indication of 
informed volatility traders’ presence in the options market. Moreover, they also document that 
information asymmetry caused by informed volatility traders has a significant price impact on 
option prices and such impact intensifies on days leading up to an announcement day. In a 
market maker oriented trading environment, one of the most important sources of risk for option 
market makers that cannot be easily hedged away is volatility risk.2 This differential of 
information knowledge regarding volatility creates an information asymmetry situation that is 
similar to any other financial market—an adverse selection problem that will affect the belief of 
market participants, and thus the securities prices.  
How do informed volatility investors behave in option markets where they face many 
alternative securities with varying strike prices, and what are the exact implications that these 
behaviors have on information structures and option prices? Determining answers to these 
questions has been the motivation for this dissertation.  
                                                
1 Cox and Rubinstein (1985) discuss the possibility that some corporate decisions would surely result in more 
volatile future cash flow, but the direction of its impact is uncertain.  
2 Although the directional movement of an underlying’s price is also a possible risk, it is relatively easy to hedge 
away. However, volatility risk is much harder to be hedged continuously and efficiently. 
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To improve the current understanding of volatility information trading and its 
implications, I build a model that generates new theories for a number of topics in the option 
pricing and the option market microstructure literature. Specifically, the model utilizes an 
asymmetric information framework to characterize the strategic interactions between an 
informed volatility trader, a continuum of market maker, and a liquidity hedger. Through a 
Bayesian Nash partial equilibrium, my theory is able to predict the behavior of an informed 
volatility trader under various circumstances. It also predicts that the degree of information 
asymmetry will be higher in an Out of The Money (OTM) option contract than an At The Money 
(ATM) contract as an equilibrium outcome. In addition, the theory suggests that heterogeneous 
information risk also plays a critical role in determining the spread structure in the option 
markets. Furthermore, this model also attempts to contribute to the literature of implied volatility 
skew (smile) from the perspective of asymmetric information. My theory indicates that in 
addition to the possibility that the implied volatility smile is a result of asymmetric information 
about volatility, the slope of the smile is also significantly influenced by the heterogeneity in 
information asymmetry caused by an informed trader’s behavior.  
Of course, it is always interesting and important to investigate whether the predictions of 
these theories are consistent with real world data. To accomplish this, I examine several 
implications of the model by empirically testing a number of hypotheses using US equity option 
data based on proprietary datasets from the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE). I find that 
the majority of my predictions are indeed consistent with the data. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as the following. In Chapter 2, I introduce the 
theoretical part of my dissertation. Section 2.1 includes a literature review on a number topics 
related to the model. The construction of the model and its predictions are outlined in Sections 
  4 
2.2 through 2.4. In Chapter 3, I empirically examine the behavior of the volatility information 
trader and the structure of information asymmetry in the US equity option market. Chapter 4 
presents the test on the relationship between volatility information trading and spread structures 
in the option market. Chapter 5 investigates the impact of heterogeneous information asymmetry 
on implied volatility skew, and Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 Theoretical Model 
2.1 Introduction 
Many established theories regarding asymmetric information in financial markets such 
Kyle (1985), Back (1993), and Easley and O’Hara (1987), just to name a few, certainly help us 
to understand why there should be a positive relationship between option’s prices and the level 
of information asymmetry concerning volatility. However, the situation can be noticeably more 
complex for option markets in which informed volatility investors see a much greater number of 
alternatives than equity markets because of the multiple option contracts available for the same 
underlying asset. These option securities feature different characteristics, from time to maturity 
to strike prices. One of the most interesting parameters of options is the strike price. On one 
hand, cheaper and more Out of The Money (OTM)3 options provide higher implicit leverage 
within the contract to the favor of informed investors. On the other hand, near the money or At 
The Money (ATM) option contracts tend to have improved liquidity and lower transaction costs. 
It is particularly interesting to investigate how informed investors allocate their capital among 
different option contracts in the face of these tradeoffs. If informed volatility traders ultimately 
prefer one type of contract to another, then this helps in predicting which option’s price will be 
most affected under certain circumstances. Therefore, knowing precisely how informed volatility 
traders behave across different contracts is essential for a better understanding of how the prices 
of different options will be impacted due information asymmetry. Unfortunately, only limited 
theories and empirical evidence exist in this area. Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) expand 
the conventional information asymmetry model to characterize the behavior of informed 
directional traders between the stock market and the options market. By allowing the informed 
                                                
3 Out of The Money options refer to those options that have zero value if executed immediately. So for Call options, 
these are options with a strike price that is greater than the current underlying price. 
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trader to choose which market to invest in given a set of market conditions governed by 
exogenous parameters, they find that an informed directional investor will more likely trade in an 
options market if greater leverage and/or better liquidity exist. Empirically, Kaul, Gaurman, 
Mahendrarajah and Zhang (2004) find evidence to support the idea that informed traders prefer 
better liquidity over implicit leverage. However, Chakraverty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2005) claim 
that the leverage effect could be the dominating factor, as their econometric approach finds that 
the information share is greatest for OTM options. One possible reason for these inconsistent 
results in this academic space is the lack of a theoretical model that specifically focuses on the 
informed volatility trader’s investment behavior while considering the features that are unique to 
option markets. This paper develops a theory that sheds new light on this issue. By endogenizing 
the implicit leverage effect into the model, the behavior of informed investors will have a 
strategic effect on market beliefs and option prices in equilibrium. Moreover, the volatility 
information trader may simultaneously trade multiple option contracts, effectively relaxing the 
implicit restriction that the degree of information asymmetry is the same across different option 
contracts. I show that, in equilibrium, informed volatility traders will behave in such a way that 
the information asymmetry in OTM contracts is greater than the information asymmetry in ATM 
contracts of the same underlying asset. 
In addition, this paper is also motivated by the incomplete and segmented explanations of 
the intra-sectional spread properties between option contracts. Because it has been clearly 
documented that informed volatility trading exists in option markets and has a significant price 
impact, it is natural to establish a connection between option spread features and information 
asymmetry. Conventional asymmetric information theories [Kyle (1985), Back (1993), Easley 
and O’Hara (1987), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)] suggest that the bid-ask spread as well as 
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the expensiveness of a financial security will be positively related to the degree of information 
asymmetry in a market where the market maker is required to provide liquidity. So logically, the 
relative degree of information asymmetry between different option contracts, which should be a 
function of the informed volatility investor’s behavior in choosing contracts with various degrees 
of implicit leverage and the market maker’s reaction, could be playing a critical role in 
determining the spread features in today’s market. Therefore, I am going to use an asymmetric 
information approach to model and explain the spread structure in option markets in relation to 
the behavior of informed volatility traders. Specifically, I attempt to contribute to the literature 
by establishing a linkage between volatility information trading and spread structure, both within 
the same option series and across different underlying assets. 
In today’s option markets, practitioners are increasingly interested in the shape of the 
volatility smile and its dynamics over time. Another key objective of this model is to touch upon 
the literature of options pricing using an asymmetric information framework, thus shedding light 
on the ongoing discussions on the characteristics and dynamics of the implied volatility skew 
(smile) in option market.  
As previously stated, much of the existing literature on asymmetric information in option 
markets focuses on the impact of information asymmetry about the mean of the underlying asset; 
in other words, the effect of informed directional investors on option markets. These studies 
include John, Koticha, and Subrahmanyam (1993), Back (1993), Biais, and Hillion (1994), 
Brennan and Cao (1996), and Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998). Cherian and Jarrow (1998) 
are the first to incorporate information asymmetry about the future volatility of an asset into the 
larger discussion of option pricing. They utilize an asymmetric information model in which 
informed directional and volatility traders can trade in an option market. They show that as a 
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possible self-fulfilling equilibrium, option values as expectations of conditional Black-Scholes 
prices could cause the implied volatility to be different across option strikes. Nandi (1999) uses a 
multi-period framework to model the effect of asymmetric information among volatility traders. 
He shows that equilibrium option prices, and thus the level of implied volatility, depend on the 
net order flow in the market. Both of these papers generate the widely documented feature of the 
implied volatility smile. The same option pricing features can also be found in other streams of 
option pricing models such as stochastic volatility models [Hull and White (1987), Wiggins 
(1987), Stein and Stein (1991), Bates (1996), etc.], and models that include GARCH features 
[Heston (1993) and Heston and Nandi (1997)]. However, to the best of knowledge, none of these 
models systematically consider the effect of the volatility investors’ strategic behavior across 
strike prices on implied volatility. In addition to being able to generate bid-ask predictions within 
the model, this model is distinct from other option pricing models in being able to introduce 
heterogeneity in the information structure across the option contracts through modeling the 
behavior of the volatility traders. The model adds an extra dimension to the existing explanations 
by freeing up the restriction that information asymmetry must be the same across option series of 
the same underlying asset. The possible heterogeneity in information asymmetry (and thus the 
shape of volatility smile) will be a function of the informed trader’s investment strategy, in 
addition to other factors related to the market environment. I show that, in equilibrium, there are 
two essential aspects that jointly determine the shape of the implied volatility smile: the 
stochastic volatility (or volatility uncertainty) arising from the asymmetric information and the 
heterogeneous information risk across the strikes. 
The rest of this chapter will be organized as the following: in Section 2.2 I will describe 
the model setup and assumptions used. The equilibrium of the model is defined in Section 2.3. 
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The results and implications for informed volatility trader’s behavior, information asymmetry, 
option price, implied volatility smile, and bid-ask spread are presented and discussed throughout 
Sections 2.4.1 through 2.4.4. 
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2.2 The Model 
The model builds on an asymmetric information structure that can be found in the 
extensive literature of market microstructure [Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985)] that assumes a strategic environment among market makers and investors. It 
considers an economy in which call option prices are determined in a partial equilibrium 
framework that was first introduced by Cherian and Jarrow (1998).  
There are three players in the economy: a continuum of risk-neutral market makers, a 
profit-maximising informed investor with private information about volatility, and a liquidity 
hedger whose investment behaviors are exogenously determined. There is no specific risk 
preference assumed for the liquidity hedger, who is assumed to trade for exogenous purposes 
such as liquidity hedging requirement. The model consists of two periods; the number of periods 
is minimized to facilitate the understanding of the model. At time 0, all three players enter the 
market. They share the same information on the stock price !, which is known to everyone. The 
participants in the market face different information sets toward the true value of volatility 
! ! !!!!!. Volatility information is available at time 0 to the informed investor as private 
information. At time 1, the true value of the volatility is revealed to all, and the option price 
converges to an equilibrium level, which is the discounted expected value of the option’s future 
payoff according to a mutually agreed distribution on the stock price:  
 !!!! !!!! !! ! ! !"# !! ! !! ! ! !! ! !!!!! !!!  ( 1 ) 
Notice that this expression is not an option price derived from any pricing formula, it is merely a 
discounted non-arbitrage option value that is determined by its expected future payoff using risk 
neutral probabilities. The time interval between Time 0 and Time 1 is assumed to be short 
enough that any potential interest earned during this period is minimal and close to zero. 
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The strategic interactions between the market participants will take place at time 0. Each 
market maker will set their bid (!!) and ask (!!) prices for the two option contracts conditional 
on the current stock price and the orders they receive; each market maker is allowed to quote one 
unit in quantity and prices are set in a competitive environment. Nature will choose which 
investor type to trade, with a probability ! that the informed volatility trader is chosen.  If an 
informed trader is selected, it is assumed that the informed investor’s action at time 0 will be to 
BUY options if she sees a high volatility, and to SELL option if observes a low volatility. 
Moreover, the informed trader must determine with what probability!!! she will invest her total 
capital !!in each of the two contracts in order to maximize her expected profit. Therefore, her 
profit from investment in one share of contract-i will be !! ! ! !!. There is no explicit 
restriction on whether informed traders are allowed to borrow before entering the option market 
when exploiting their informational advantage. However, it is implicitly assumed here that if she 
decides to borrow, there is an upper limit to which she can expand her capital through 
borrowing; therefore, the total available capital for the informed trader is constrained at a fixed 
level (!!). This assumption is an extremely relaxed one in the context of the entire model. The 
result of the model does not rely on the actual size of the investable wealth by the informed 
trader. As long as the informed face some financial frictions for borrowing (which tends to be the 
case in today’s financial markets), there will be an upper limit on the amount of capital that an 
informed trader can invest, which is sufficient to guarantee the results. Finally, if an uninformed 
liquidity hedger is chosen, she will buy and sell options equal to the same total value of !!. In 
addition, between the two available contracts, she will be assigned a probability !! of the total 
value !! by nature to trade in contract-i. When nature has decided whom to trade, the submitted 
orders will be channeled to an “order-pool” for each option contract, and then these pooled 
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orders will be allocated randomly to the continuum of market makers. Thus, when the pooled 
trades are distributed randomly across the population of market makers, for each market maker, 
the ex-ante probability of receiving an order for contract-i is equal to the probability of the 
informed investor choosing contract-i. Therefore, ex-ante, the main objective of the market 
makers is to conjecture both the likelihood of each of their quotes being hit as well as under what 
circumstances each case will occur. At time 1, either ! or ! is realized to the public with equal 
probability. In the rest of this paper, the initial endowment of the two types of investors will be 
assumed to be the same. This can be achieved without the loss of generality: the relative wealth 
will only impact the priors of the market maker, yet the probability of who is selected to trade 
(!! is set to be arbitrary.  
There are two call option contracts4 traded in this economy: ! !!!! !! !!"#!! !!!! !! , 
which only differ in terms of their strike prices: !! ! !! ! !!. Because I am not specifying any 
pricing function for the options at this stage, the following properties on the true value of an 
option at time 1 are assumed:   
 ! !!!! !! !! ! !!!! !! !  ( 2 ) 
 
! !!!! !! ! ! !!!! !!
! !!!! !!
!
! !!!! !! ! ! !!!! !!
! !!!! !!
!"  ( 3 ) 
The first assumption is very intuitive. Inequality (2) essentially states that the call option 
contract with the higher strike price (referred to hereinafter as Contract-1) will have a lower 
value, thus the potential of providing higher implicit leverage. The second assumption is 
                                                
4 The choice of Call options is simply for the reason of convenient demonstration. One can easily apply the 
framework of this model into considering the trading of Put options where such a scenario is more relevant. All 
major qualitative conclusions from the model would remain unchanged. 
5 This model does not consider options that are In The Money (ITM) for two reasons. First, ITM contracts provide 
the least leverage to informed traders compared with OTM and ATM contracts. Second, future uncertainty on the 
value of an ITM contract is relatively small; including it into the model does not add much insight and will not 
change the qualitative result.  
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equivalent to saying that the elasticity of the option value with respect to volatility is smaller for 
the ATM contract with a lower strike price (referred to hereinafter as Contract-2) than the OTM 
contract. Notice that these assumptions are quite general and usually true in an actual option 
market. In fact, the first assumption on option price is always true under any non-arbitrage 
environment. Intuitively, the second assumption assures that the option values satisfy the 
condition that the rate of return, or the bang per buck, is greater for a single share of the more 
OTM Contract-1 than Contract-2. Alternatively, another way to interpret Inequality (3) is that it 
assumes the OTM has a higher per dollar exposure to volatility, thus providing higher implicit 
leverage for volatility traders. One could show that, under the Black-Scholes pricing formula, 
this inequality condition can be written as:  
! !!!! !! ! ! !!!! !!
! ! ! ! !!!! !!
!
! !!!! !! ! ! !!!! !!
! ! ! ! !!!! !!
 
! !"#
!!!
! !!!! !! ! ! !!!! !!
! ! ! ! !!!! !!
! !"#
!!!
! !!!! !! ! ! !!!! !!
! ! ! ! !!!! !!
 
!
!" !!!! !!
!"
! !!!! !!
!
!" !!!! !!
!"
! !!!! !!
 
In terms of Black-Scholes Greeks, 
 !
!"#$!!!!
!" !!!! !!
!
!"#$!!!!
!" !!!! !!
"  ( 4 ) 
Thus, Inequality (4) implies that if the conditional B-S formula correctly characterizes the 
option value in the second period of this economy, then the second assumption requires the ratio 
of option Vega to its price, or ‘the per-dollar Vega’, in the low volatility state to be higher for the 
OTM Contract-1. Due to the complexity of analytically proving this, I performed a large number 
of numerical calculations using a wide range of parameter values to examine the validity of this 
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assumption as shown in Inequality (4) .The results convincingly suggest that the assumption also 
appears to be highly plausible in a B-S setting. Figure 1 illustrates an example in the numerical 
examinations in which the stock price is $35. We can see that the implicit leverage (Vega/$) of 
options clearly increases with the strike price.
 
Figure 1. Implicit Leverage for Volatility Traders under B-S Formula 
This figure demonstrates the varying implicit leverage, measured by option’s Vega/option price, embedded in 
options with different strike under Black-Scholes pricing formula. Parameters used in this example are S=35, !=0.3, 
r=0.3, !!(maturity in years)=0.125. 
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To summarize, in the economy described above, the market maker’s and the informed 
investor’s decision problem can be characterized as follows:6  
Market Maker’s problem: 
At time 0, competitive market makers set their bid and ask so that the expected profit in 
each option contract is zero: 
   !! ! !! ! !! !! !"!!   
  ! !" ! !"!! ! !! !! !! ! !" ! !"!! ! !! !! !! "  ( 5 ) 
   !! ! !! ! !! !! !"#!! "  
  ! !" ! !"#!! ! !! !! !! ! !" ! !"#!! ! !! !! !! "  ( 6 ) 
where !" ! is the conditional probability on the state of the economy from the market 
maker’s perspective should one of their quotes gets hit by traders’ orders. 
Informed Investor’s Problem: 
An informed investor seeks to maximize her total expected profit using her informational 
advantage, and does so by allocating probabilities between the two option contracts. Let us first 
consider the case of a high volatility state, i.e., ! ! !. Informed!!-trader needs to determine with 
what probability she wants to invest in each option contract by choosing !! and !!:  
 !"#
!!
! !!
!!
!!!
!!! ! ! !!!!"  
 !!! !! !!! ! !!!"#!! ! !!! ! !   ( 7 ) 
  
If a low volatility state is observed, i.e.,!! ! !, the informed investor will sell options to 
maximize her total expected profit:  
                                                
6 The behavior of the liquidity hedger is determined exogenously by nature. 
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 !"#
!!
! !!
!!
!!!
!!! ! !! ! !!"  
 !!! !! !!
! ! !!!"#!! ! !!
! ! !   ( 8 ) 
"
Notice that the probabilities of choosing contract-i could be different in high or low volatility 
states. In this model, the ask or bid prices in equilibrium add an extra dimension to the existing 
leverage effect implied within the structure of the option contract. The higher the equilibrium ask 
(or bid) price as a result of information asymmetry; the lower the implicit leverage for the 
informed trader. This dynamic between the market maker and the informed investor generates an 
interesting trade-off. The informed volatility trader wants to increase her probabilistic strategy in 
Contract-1, !!, as much as possible to take advantage of the implicit leverage and better rate of 
return; however, she also wants to reduce !! to hide her presence in the market from the market 
maker, thus holding down the equilibrium price of Contract-1. Therefore, the informed trader has 
to maximise her profit by balancing this trade-off given the available contracts. Finally, the 
second constraint in the informed investor’s problem can also be interpreted as a “no-shorting” 
constraint after she entered the market, which restricts the investor from short-selling one 
contract for the sake of purchasing more of the other. However, as discussed earlier, this 
constraint is also consistent with the idea that borrowing outside the option market is implicitly 
allowed in this model.  
It is useful to display this informational structure and trading process in diagrams:  
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Figure 2. The Timeline of Underlying Asset’s Price Movement. 
This figure shows that the timeline of the underlying asset has two stages. Its initial value is known to the public in 
t=0, but not the volatility. In t=1, the volatility state is revealed to everyone and the asset’s future price is distributed 
given the true volatility. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Game Structure at Time 0. 
This figure summarizes how trading orders are likely to arrive from the maker maker’s perspective. 
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All of the players know the structure of the trading process. Market makers will associate 
a higher conditional probability to the high (low) volatility state if they receive a BUY (SELL) 
order because the informed investor will buy options only if she observes high volatility. Thus, 
with Bayes updating, the key objective for the market maker is to form her expectation of the 
option price at Time 0 conditional on which of her quotes might be hit. For example, from the 
market maker’s perspective: 
!" ! !"!! !
!" !! !!"!!
!" !! !!"!! ! !" !! !!"!!
! 
!!!"!! !" !! !!"!! ! !" !"#$%&'(!!"!! !!"!! ! !" !"#$"%!!"!! !!"!!  
!
!
!
!!! !
!
!
! ! ! !! ! 
!"#! !" !! !!"!! ! !" !"#$"%!!"!! !!"!! !
!
!
! ! ! !! ! 
!!!"! !" ! !"!! !
!
!!!! !
!
! !! ! !!
!
!!!! ! !! ! !!
!
!!! ! !! ! !!
!!! ! ! !! ! !!
! 
!"#"$%&$'! !" ! !"#!! !
!! ! !!
!!! ! ! !! ! !!
 
One example for the duration of each period in the model could be one trading day. In 
this case, if one thinks of Time 0 as being trading day t, then Time 1 is the beginning of trading 
day t+1; therefore, the daily volatility and distribution of the closing stock price is determined at 
the opening of t+1.This example also implies that multiple strategic interactions between the 
market participants may occur during one trading day. Consequently, market makers are able to 
continuously update their beliefs throughout the day; however, these dynamic implications will 
not be discussed in this section. 
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A final remark needs to be made at this stage. One might argue that it is more realistic to 
assume a case of continuum of informed investors in the option market. In fact, there is an 
alternative interpretation of the model environment that will eventually lead to the same 
information (probability) structure and player’s problem. This alternative structure could capture 
a market situation in which there is a single market maker, a continuum of informed volatility 
investors, and also a continuum of liquidity hedgers. Nature still plays the same role in deciding 
which volatility state is realized and in choosing whether informed investors would trade with 
probability !. However, either type of investors, if selected by the nature, must still choose 
which of the two option contracts to trade at Time 0—but not both. The liquidity hedgers will 
buy or sell with equal probability regardless of the volatility state, and nature will assign a 
probability !! for trading Contract-i. But for the informed investors, each investor’s strategy at 
the beginning of the game will be optimally choosing the probability!!! of trading either contract. 
Because !! is a probability variable, both constraints !!! ! !!!"#!! ! !!! ! ! are 
automatically satisfied. Finally, the risk-neutral market maker’s objective remains to quote the 
bid and ask prices for each contract such that, given the informed investor’s probabilistic 
strategy, the expected profit is zero. This model environment will produce exactly the same 
beliefs, objective functions, as well as equilibrium results as the previously explained 
environment. Both explanations have significant and valid economic interpretations. More 
importantly, both standpoints can lead to the same structural model that is designed to answer the 
fundamental question that this paper is seeking to explore: How does informed investors’ 
behavior in option markets as a whole affect the information structure of the market and the 
properties of option prices? 
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2.3 Equilibrium 
Time 1 
The equilibrium prices of call options at Time 1 are determined solely by a non-arbitrage 
condition since there is no differential information remains in the market.7 The value of the call 
options is equal to its future expected payoff conditional on the current stock price and the 
distribution given the realization of volatility. For example, if a log-normal distribution is 
assumed to be the common belief among market participants, then the equilibrium option value 
in this period can be priced by the Black-Scholes formula conditional on the realization of 
volatility. In fact, any arbitrary distributions could support such equilibrium; please refer to 
Cherian and Jarrow (1998) for a detailed discussion. 
Time 0 
Given the equilibrium prices in Time 1, the equilibrium at this stage is characterized as a 
Nash Equilibrium, such that neither the market maker nor the informed trader will deviate from 
their strategies. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, given the model parameters !!! !! !!!!! !! !!!, the informed 
trader’s strategy set !!!!
!
!!!
!!!, and the set of ask and bid prices from the market maker !! !!! : 
The informed investor’s expected profit is maximized given their information at Time 0. 
The market maker earns zero expected profit at Time 0. 
 
2.4 Results 
I will discuss the result of this model for the most part considering the state of ! ! ! in 
the second period. Most of the results will be symmetric when low volatility is observed and the 
                                                
7 This follows the same characterization of equilibrium as in Cherian and Jarrow (1998). 
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informed investor decides to sell options; this will be become intuitive and clear in the later 
sections where the implications for cross-sectional spread features are analyzed. Because some 
illustrations of the results involve numerical demonstrations, I am going to select specific values 
for the option characteristics. Unless otherwise stated, the following parameter values are 
assigned to each option contract as Standard Example in the numerical examples. 
!! ! !"! !! ! !"! !! ! !"! !! ! !"! ! ! !!!" 
!"#!!!!! ! !!!"! !! ! !!!"!! 
 
2.4.1 Informed Investor’s Behavior & Information Asymmetry: 
The process for obtaining equilibrium in this economy involves solving for the Nash 
equilibrium, which can be achieved through numerous methods. I will demonstrate the process 
with a simple and standard procedure.  
In substituting the market maker’s equilibrium strategy into the objective function of the 
informed investor, we obtain the new problem as below: 
!"#
!!! !
!!!
!!
!! ! ! !! !
!!!
!!
!! ! ! !! ! 
!! !!!!!!! ! !! ! !! !! ! !! ! ! 
! ! "!!! !
!!! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! ! !!
!!! ! ! !! ! !!
!
!
!!
!
!!! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! ! !!
!!! ! ! !! ! !!
!
!
!!
 
!! !!!!!!! ! !! ! !! !! ! !! ! ! 
! ! "!!! !!
!!! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! ! !!
!!!!! ! ! !! ! !!!!! ! ! !! ! !
!
!!! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! ! !!
!!!!! ! ! !! ! !!!!! ! ! !! ! !
! 
!! !!!!!!! ! !! ! !! !! ! !! ! ! 
Because the ask price in the profit function for the informed trader will be a non-linear 
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function of the objective variable in equilibrium, a quick check on the concavity of the profit 
function will provide some insights to the nature of the solution. Figure 4 plots the total profit of 
the informed trader against the increasing value of !! for a particular set of parameter values. It 
shows that the profit function first increases in!!! and then decreases after reaching its peak. If 
different parameter values for the probabilities are used, the curve primarily shifts horizontally; 
different option contracts will alter the slope of this curve, but its shape remains the same.  
 
Figure 4. Profit Function for Informed Investor 
This figure plots the profit for the informed volatility investor as a function of her strategy !!. Parameter values are 
the same as described earlier, and ! ! !!!! !! ! !!!. 
 
In solving the constrained maximization problem stated above, we obtain the equilibrium 
strategy as: 
 
"#"$!
"#%!
"#%$!
"#&!
"#&$!
"#'!
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! !!!!! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
"
( 9 )  
 
See appendix for details. 
Since the model does not permit negative probabilities (or short-selling one option 
contract to finance the other one), namely !!! ! !!!!, the model can generate two types of 
equilibrium: Interior equilibrium or Boundary equilibrium.8 An interior equilibrium (! ! !!! !
!) refers to the situation that is optimal for an informed trader to have a mixed strategy in 
selecting both contracts, whereas a boundary equilibrium (!!! ! !!!"!!) implies that, given the 
market parameters and environment, it is most profitable for the informed investor to trade only 
one option contract to exploit her informational advantage. Depending on the equilibrium type, 
the model will predict different results for relative information asymmetry, as well as for the 
pricing behavior of the options. Therefore, the discussions below are organized to show the 
conditions, if any, under which the equilibrium solution is an interior one, or when it is on the 
boundary. 
Proposition 1.1:  
An informed trader will always assign a positive probability for an OTM higher 
leveraged Contract-1.  
 !!
! ! !  ( 10 ) 
Proof: see appendix  
                                                
8 This is very similar to the notion of ‘pooling equilibrium’ and ‘separating equilibrium’ in Easley, O’Hara, and 
Srinivas (1998). They consider two different markets, whereas I consider two option contracts with different 
characteristics, which allows for a direct comparison between the returns that the two option contracts may offer to 
the volatility traders. 
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This proposition implies that, in equilibrium, it is always optimal for the informed 
volatility trader to invest in the OTM contract to take advantage of the high leverage, regardless 
of the parameter value of !!!"!!!. In fact, we can predict this result by learning from the graph 
of informed trader’s profit function in Figure 4. Because of the higher marginal return associated 
with the more leveraged Contract-1, the positive slope on the left hand side of the graph indicates 
that the total profit for the informed trader will always increase with the positive probability in 
the OTM contract at the initial stage.  
Proposition 1.2: 
An informed trader will allocate all of her capital into the cheaper Contract-1 (!!! ! !) if 
and only if: 
 
! ! ! !!
!
! !  ( 11 ) 
!!!"!!! !
!! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! !! !
 
"
See appendix for proof. 
This proposition shows that, given the properties of the two option contracts, it might be 
possible that, in equilibrium, the informed trader only trade  the higher leveraged Contract-1. 
However, this could only happen if, in equilibrium, the ratio of liquidity hedger to informed 
trader is high enough in Contract-1 so that the informed trader is able to hide their orders in the 
market.9 Here is a possible scenario where boundary equilibrium exists. Suppose that Contract-2 
                                                
9 The condition for the existence of boundary equilibrium strictly depends on the option contracts in the economy. 
Surprisingly, the right hand side of inequality (11) does not depend on the specific parameter values of the contracts 
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is ATM and Contract-1 is 15% OTM, then we have a threshold ! equal to 0.8867. We can 
interpret this as an informed investor will only invest all of her money in Contract-1with 
certainty if, ex-post, for every informed trade in Contract-1 there is approximately more than 
0.8867 trade from uninformed traders. In this case, if we have an economy where there are 70% 
chance that a liquidity hedger is chosen (! ! !!!) and a 40% chance that her capital is invested 
in OTM Contract-1 (!! ! !!!), then the ratio 
!!! !!
!
 equals 0.93, which is higher than the 
threshold, thereby sustaining a boundary equilibrium. 
Theorem 1: 
An interior equilibrium exists, that is an informed investor with private volatility 
information will split investment between two contracts, if and only if:  
! ! ! !!
!
!
!! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! !! !
  ( 12 ) 
 
By combining proposition 2.1 and 2.2, we can obtain this theorem. It suggests that given 
the option prices in Time 1, if this condition on the relative player participation in the market is 
satisfied, it is optimal for the informed trader to invest in both option contracts at time 0 to 
maximize her profit. If not, according to Proposition 1.2, she will choose to invest all of her 
capital into the cheaper Contract-1 in order to take full advantage of the leverage. This theorem 
has a similar intuition to the ‘pooling equilibrium’ criteria between stock and option markets in 
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998). Both models suggest that a relatively balanced liquidity 
                                                                                                                                                       
if Black-Scholes values are used as an equilibrium value in Time 1. Rather, the threshold only depends on the 
moneyness of the OTM option contract, regardless of the specific stock or strike price. To illustrate some examples: 
(i) in the standard example: ! ! !! ! !"! !! ! !", Contract-1 is 16.3% OTM, !=0.8739; (ii) ! ! !! ! !""! !! !
!!", Contract-1 is 15% OTM, !=0.8867;  (iii) ! ! !! ! !"! !! ! !"!!, Contract-1 is 15% OTM, !=0.8867. 
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between contracts (markets) is essential for an informed investor to trade in both securities. But 
this paper is able to provide a more direct interpretation of the liquidity ratio in terms of the 
actual option price and characteristics, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Once the equilibrium solution for the informed investor’s strategy is derived, we can infer 
their actions as the economic environment varies using some comparative statics analyses. It is 
well documented in existing literature that the market environment will change from time to 
time. For instance, the total number of informed traders relative to uninformed traders may 
increase10 around days of critical importance such as event announcement days. Liquidity 
hedgers could also change their trading behaviors due to other exogenous factors. This model 
could shed light on how informed investors adjust their optimal strategy in equilibrium as the 
market structure changes. The following propositions come from key comparative statics that are 
analytically derived, which can help predict how informed volatility trader change her behavior 
when deciding how to strategize her investment between the two contracts. The primary results 
below are based on local derivative analysis, meaning that these propositions are only valid when 
considering the interior equilibrium; comments regarding boundary equilibrium will be made 
whenever necessary. 
Proposition 1.3: 
As the overall percentage of informed volatility investors increases, their optimal strategy 
in the higher leveraged contract falls.  
 
!!!
!
!"
! !  ( 13 ) 
                                                
10 This is the same as saying that the probability of an informed trader being chosen has increased, so I will be using 
the two descriptions interchangeably. Similar arguments will also be applied for the probability of a liquidity hedger 
being selected. 
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Proposition 1.4: 
As !! increases, i.e., the liquidity hedgers increase their probability for Contract-2, the 
informed trader’s optimal strategy is also to increase their allocation in the higher leveraged 
Contract-1.  
 
!!!
!
!!!
! !  ( 14 ) 
 
Intuitively, it will be more difficult for informed traders to hide their orders in the market 
as their population in the market rises. To reduce their presence in the eyes of market makers and 
thus maintain the leverage advantage of OTM Contract-1, informed investors must reduce their 
probabilityof total investment in Contract-1. 
Proofs for both propositions are contained in the appendix. When the liquidity 
hedgers’ trades move across to the cheaper contract, total liquidity in this contract increases. 
Because market makers observe this, an informed investor can thus increase their allocation in 
Contract-1 for higher profit without increasing market maker’s information risk. In other 
words, it helps the informed investors to shift their investment into Contract-1 and improve 
their total profit without increasing the price. See the appendix for proofs on both 
propositions. Figure 5 presents an example of the optimal behavior of an informed volatility 
trader under a different combination of market conditions. As illustrated in Propositions 1.3 
and 1.4, we see that an informed volatility trader will invest more aggressively in an OTM 
contract as the higher percentage of the liquidity hedger’s transactions goes to the OTM 
contract or as the overall concentration of informed traders (!) decreases. The flat portion of 
this graph on the northeast corner represents all of the conditions under which boundary 
equilibrium is reached; in this example, threshold (!) is 0.8379. 
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Figure 5. Optimal Strategy for Informed Volatility Investor 
This figure plots an example of an informed volatility trader’s optimal strategy under different combinations of 
!!!"#!!!. The option contract used in this example is the standard one. 
 
A critical objective of this model is to provide another framework that attempts to explain 
how option prices and the implied volatility behave under different structures of information 
asymmetry while incorporating the strategic behavior of an informed investor. Conventional 
wisdom may suggest that that informed traders should participate more in the OTM contract 
because of its higher implicit leverage. Interestingly enough, in a market such as the example in 
Figure 5, there are indeed many conditions that could support informed traders strictly preferring 
an OTM contract (!! ! !!!). However, it is imperative to be able to differentiate the notions of 
the informed trader’s behavior and the level of information asymmetry. While the former 
characterizes the informed investor’s preference over the two contracts (and her optimal strategy 
in investing them), the latter is of more importance to the market maker and pricing of options, 
which is determined by the relative participation between the informed trader and the liquidity 
hedger. One contributing feature of this paper is that the level of information asymmetry in each 
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option contract is determined endogenously. As a result, the degree of information asymmetry in 
equilibrium could easily be different across the two contracts. If exogenous factors influence 
option prices such that there will be higher information asymmetry in the OTM contract than in 
the ATM contract, the difference in their prices, as well as the implied volatilities, could be even 
larger than what other models would have predicted by assuming a universal degree of adverse 
selection.  
The Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) [Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and 
(1997)] is a conventional measure of information asymmetry used in many other papers. It 
attempts to capture the degree of information asymmetry in a particular financial market by 
calculating the probability that a trade in the market comes from an informed investor. In the 
context of this model, such probability for each option contract can be characterized as:  
 !"!!
!"# !
!!!
!
!!!
! ! ! !! ! !!
  ( 15 ) 
"
The numerator represents the probability that the market maker will receive an order from the 
informed trader for contract-i. The denominator is the total probability that the market maker will 
receive any order for contract-i in the next period.  
Proposition 1.5:  
The equilibrium level of information asymmetry about volatility is greater (weakly) in the 
OTM contract than the ATM contract. Namely:  
 !"!!
!"# ! !"!!
!"#  ( 16 ) 
 
This proposition shows that, under equilibrium, the best action by an informed volatility 
trader and market maker will always result in a higher volatility information risk in an OTM 
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contract. The proof of Proposition 1.4 is included in the appendix. The process of this proof 
simply shows that as long as the OTM contract provides higher implicit leverage in Time 1, then 
the ATM contract has higher information risk than the OTM contract cannot be sustained under 
an interior equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because it is always in the best interest of the informed 
trader to increase the investment in the OTM contract as long as it provides a higher “bang-per-
buck” than the ATM option. When we have a case where the information asymmetry is higher in 
the ATM contract, the market maker will adjust the ATM option price relatively higher than the 
OTM contract, meaning that Contract-1 has an even greater leverage advantage in Time 0 than 
the perfect information case. This incentivizes informed investors to continue investing more in 
Contract-1, which means that the previous case cannot be in equilibrium. 
Table 1 provides a numerical example of Proposition 1.4. We see that the information 
asymmetry is predicted to be higher in OTM Contract-1 than in Contract-2 as a consequence of 
the equilibrium behavior from the informed investors for all combinations of parameters. This 
result is insensitive to the type of equilibrium because, in the case of boundary equilibrium, all 
informed traders would place their orders in Contract-1, which simply leads to zero asymmetric 
information for Contract-2.  
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Table 1. Simulated Levels of Information Asymmetry (PIN) under Equilibrium 
Each pair of values represents the different level of asymmetric information (measured by PIN) for the two option 
contracts at equilibrium for a selected range of the market environment. The following parameters are used for 
options C-1 and C-2 as stated earlier: ! ! !!!"! !! ! !!!",!!! ! !"! !! ! !"! !! ! !"! !! ! !"! ! ! !!!"  
Total % of 
informed 
(a1)  
!"#$"%&'()*%+*"$,(-.(/0.*%+1*23(4536(
783( 789( 78:( 78;( 78<( 78=( 78>( 78?( 78@(
  C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 C-1 C-2 
0.1 0.36 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 
0.15 0.39 0.03 0.31 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 
0.2 0.41 0.06 0.38 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.00 
0.25 0.43 0.09 0.40 0.04 0.36 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.00 
0.3 0.45 0.13 0.42 0.08 0.39 0.03 0.35 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.19 0.00 
0.35 0.47 0.17 0.44 0.12 0.42 0.07 0.39 0.03 0.35 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.23 0.00 
0.4 0.49 0.21 0.47 0.17 0.44 0.12 0.42 0.08 0.39 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.27 0.00 
0.45 0.52 0.25 0.49 0.21 0.47 0.17 0.45 0.13 0.42 0.08 0.40 0.04 0.37 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.31 0.00 
0.5 0.54 0.30 0.52 0.26 0.50 0.22 0.48 0.18 0.45 0.14 0.43 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.38 0.02 0.36 0.00 
0.55 0.57 0.35 0.55 0.31 0.53 0.28 0.51 0.24 0.49 0.21 0.47 0.17 0.45 0.13 0.42 0.09 0.40 0.05 
0.6 0.61 0.40 0.59 0.37 0.57 0.34 0.55 0.31 0.53 0.27 0.51 0.24 0.49 0.21 0.47 0.17 0.45 0.13 
0.65 0.64 0.45 0.62 0.43 0.61 0.40 0.59 0.37 0.57 0.34 0.55 0.31 0.54 0.28 0.52 0.25 0.50 0.22 
0.7 0.68 0.52 0.66 0.49 0.65 0.47 0.63 0.44 0.62 0.42 0.60 0.39 0.59 0.37 0.57 0.34 0.55 0.32 
0.75 0.72 0.58 0.71 0.56 0.69 0.54 0.68 0.52 0.67 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.46 0.63 0.44 0.61 0.41 
0.8 0.76 0.65 0.75 0.63 0.74 0.62 0.73 0.60 0.72 0.59 0.71 0.57 0.70 0.55 0.69 0.53 0.68 0.52 
0.85 0.81 0.73 0.81 0.71 0.80 0.70 0.79 0.69 0.78 0.68 0.77 0.67 0.76 0.65 0.76 0.64 0.75 0.63 
0.9 0.87 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.86 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.85 0.78 0.84 0.77 0.84 0.76 0.83 0.75 0.82 0.74 
 
Proposition 1.4 also has profound empirical implications on a variety of topics. It is 
consistent with much of the empirical evidence regarding the informational content in OTM 
options. I show that information asymmetry is indeed greater in OTM options than in ATM 
options as an equilibrium outcome. For example, Chakraverty, Gulen and Mayhew find that the 
information share is the greatest for OTM options using econometric estimations; and Pan and 
Poteshman (2006) find that information embedded in more OTM option contracts has greater 
predictive power than ATM options.  In the following section, I discuss how this proposition, 
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and its extensions, can help explain the spread structure and the implied volatility skew in option 
markets.  
 
2.4.2 Option Price in Equilibrium 
In this model, the equilibrium price at Time 0 is the market maker’s expected value of the 
contract, given the optimal strategy of the informed traders. Specifically, if we insert equilibrium 
!!
! into the expression for the ask-price, we can obtain the equilibrium ask-price for contract-i as:  
!! !! ! !! !
!!!
! ! !! ! !!
!!!
! ! ! !! ! !!
! !! ! !
!! ! !!
!!!
! ! ! !! ! !!
! !! !   ( 17 ) 
"
This can be interpreted as a weighted average between the high-volatility state price and low-
volatility state price, where the weights are the equilibrium conditional probabilities with respect 
to each state from the perspective of the market makers. Similar to other asymmetric information 
models in existing literature, whenever there is an exogenous shock to the market environment, 
i.e., a change in the parameter value of ! and !!, market makers will update their beliefs 
according to these exogenous factors and thus cause price movement. One of the key features 
this model is attempts to characterize is the presence of a secondary effect on the option price 
following the initial exogenous shock; the informed trader’s optimal strategy will endogenously 
guide her to also adjust investment behavior, thus further affecting the market maker’s belief and 
information asymmetry and moving the equilibrium price accordingly. Simply put, because !!! is 
also a function of ! and !! in equilibrium, a change in either of the parameters will change !!!, 
which further affects the option price of each contract. 
One expects the ask-price to increase with the level of informed traders but decrease with 
the number of liquidity hedgers in the market according to existing theories. However, since the 
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informed traders’ choice also depends on those two factors, the secondary effect has the potential 
to move the price in the opposite direction. For instance, because the informed trader’s optimal 
strategy depends on the liquidity hedger’s strategy in the contracts, a shift of liquidity hedger 
strategy from Contract-1 to Contract-2 will initially increase the probability of liquidity traders in 
Contract-2 and decrease its price according to equation (17). But this will be followed by the 
adjustments of the informed investor’s investment strategy; by Proposition 1.4, the informed 
investor should also increase their strategy in Contract-2, which may offset some impacts caused 
by the initial change of liquidity hedgers.  
Proposition 2.1: 
The ask-price of both option contracts will increase with the overall share of informed 
traders in the market:  
 
!!!
!
!"
! !  ( 18 ) 
 
!!!
!
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! !  ( 19 ) 
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These results are not trivial, specifically because of the secondary effect mentioned earlier. 
While the overall level of information asymmetry increases in this market, the prices for both 
options will initially be subject to upward pressure. However, as the market price begins to rise, 
the relative leverage advantage of Contract-1 will fall, causing some informed investment to shift 
to Contract-2 to seek higher profit margins. This effect will further push up the price of option 
Contract-2. However, the key point here is that it will also reduce the information asymmetry in 
Contract-1, which affects the price in the opposite direction as the initial pressure. This 
proposition demonstrates that the initial upward pressure will always outweigh the secondary 
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leverage effect in Contract-1. Proof of this proposition can also be found in the appendix. As for 
a boundary solution, the effect of changes in ! on option prices is relatively easy to decipher. An 
increase in the overall level of informed traders will only increase the information asymmetry in 
Contract-1, but not Contract-2 because there is no informed investor present in Contract-2 in a 
boundary equilibrium.  
The impact of an exogenous movement in the liquidity hedger’s preference on the option 
price is more complex to analyse. For instance, if the liquidity hedger has a higher probability of 
investing her capital into the OTM Contract-1, i.e., !! increases (!! decreases), the liquidity in 
Contract-1 (Contract-2) will initially improve (worsen), thus decreasing (increasing) the option 
price. However, an increase in !! will also increase the optimal strategy of an informed trader in 
Contract-1 (!!!), in the equilibrium, which will increase (decrease) the option price for Contract-1 
(Contract-2) as the degree of adverse selection problem in each contract changes. In this case, 
whenever the change in the market environment results from the liquidity hedger’s behavior, the 
secondary “leverage” effect will push the option price in the opposite direction of the initial price 
movement. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate a numerical example for both option contracts that the 
information asymmetry, thus the price, will decrease with the probability of the liquidity 
hedger’s investment in the OTM Contract-1 (!!).  
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Figure 6. Equilibrium Ask-Price of Contract-1 
This graph demonstrates the ask-price for Contract-1. 
The vertical z-axis is the ask-price. Left horizontal 
axis is the value of !; right horizontal axis is the 
value of !!. 
 
 
Figure 7. Equilibrium Ask-Price of Contract-2 
This graph demonstrates the ask-price for Contract-2. 
The vertical z-axis is the ask-price. Left horizontal 
axis is the value of !; right horizontal axis is the 
value of !!.  
 
Furthermore, Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate Proposition 2.1; as the value of ! rises, the 
equilibrium information asymmetry increases in both of the markets, pushing up the market 
maker’s conditional expected value and the price of both options when seeing a BUY order, 
despite the fact that increasing ! would alternate an informed trader’s strategy in this market. 
Notice that there is also no effect on the ask-price of Contract-2 as !! changes for small values of 
!; this is because under these market conditions, we are at the boundary solution and there is no 
informed trader’s presence in the ATM contract. Any marginal changes in !! that do not change 
an informed trader’s optimal strategy will not change the ask-price of Contract-2. 
However, one seemingly counter-intuitive result needs to be emphasized: this model 
predicts that the ask-prices for both Contract-1 and Contract-2 decrease with !!. As the 
probability of liquidity hedger’s investment increases (decreases) in Contract-1 (Contract-2), this 
initially decreases (increases) the degree information asymmetry in the respective market, which 
helps to push the ask-price down (up). At the same time, Proposition 1.4 shows that an informed 
trader’s strategy moves toward (away from) the more leveraged OTM Contract-1 (less leveraged 
!!! !!! 
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Contract-2) as a result of the secondary ‘leverage’ effect, which increases (decreases) the ask-
price. It seems that the prices for two contracts should end up moving in opposite directions after 
the information structure is redefined in the market. But the graphs demonstrate a different story. 
The fact that the ask-price for Contract-1 decreases implies that the initial effect in this contract 
is greater than the secondary effect that comes from the informed trader’s adjustment. To the 
contrary, the fact that we see the ask-price of Contract-2 also fall indicates that the relative 
magnitude of the opposite secondary “leverage” effect is greater for Contract-2. More 
importantly, this implies that the information asymmetry under the new equilibrium will 
decrease in both contracts in this example.  
 
2.4.3 Implied Volatility and Shape of the Skew (Smile) 
There have been a number of previous models that try to explain the empirical 
phenomenon of an implied volatility smile in option prices. Among them, Cherian and Jarrow 
(1998) are the first to incorporate information asymmetry about the future volatility of an asset 
into the discussion of option pricing. While they clearly show that an implied volatility smile can 
be generated because the equilibrium option prices are expectations of Black-Sholes prices due 
to the asymmetric information between market makers and informed traders, they implicitly 
assume that informed volatility traders treat each option contract the same. However, as 
demonstrated in previous sections, the level of information asymmetry can easily be different 
between option contracts as a result of implicit leverage and liquidity. In fact, Proposition 1.4 
shows that information risk in an OTM contract is always no less than in an ATM contract. In 
this section, I provide a detailed discussion on the impact of heterogeneity in information 
asymmetry (a new feature of this model) on the relative expensiveness (measured by implied 
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volatility) of OTM and ATM contracts. In particular, I elucidate why an informed volatility 
trader’s behavior will affect the skewness (slope) of the volatility smile. Furthermore, the manner 
in which the dispersion in information asymmetry between option contracts varies from time to 
time will also undoubtedly affect the shape of the volatility smile over time. I demonstrate how 
the changes in different model parameters will change the equilibrium outcome, allowing us to 
better understand the dynamic evolution of the IV skew as well as the cross-section variations.  
Recall that in equilibrium, the ask-price of a call option can be expressed as the expected 
value of the option based on the conditional probability of each volatility state:  
 !! ! !"! ! !"# ! !! !! !! ! !"! ! !"# ! !! !! !! !!!"#!! ! !!!  ( 20 ) 
 !!!"!!!"! ! !"# ! !
!!! ! ! ! ! !!
!!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
  
 
Now, let us define the Black-Scholes implied volatility based on the equilibrium ask-
price in the market, as:  
 !! ! !! ! !! !! !"# ! !" !!! !! !  ( 21 ) 
 !!!"!!!!!!"!!!!!!"#$!%&!!"#$%&#&%'!!"!!"#$%$&'$#(!!"#$!%!!"#$%  
 
Although the skewness of implied volatility (IV) is typically described as the slope of 
the smile on either side of the ATM strike price; because there are only two option contracts 
in this model, IV skew is defined as the vertical distance between the implied volatility of 
Contract-1 and Contract-2 as shown in Figure 8:  
 !"#$ ! !! ! !!!  ( 22 ) 
 !!!"!!!!!! !!"!!!!!!"#$!%&!!"#!!"#$%&#&%'!!"!!"#!!!"#$%&!$  
"
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Figure 8. Characterize Implied Volatility Skew 
This Figure illustrates how Implied Volatility Skew is defined and measured in this model. In this most simplistic 
economy, IV Skew is measured by the vertical distance in terms of B-S implied volatility between Contract 1 and 2. 
 
From equation (20) through equation (22), it is critical to notice that there are two aspects that 
determine the level of implied volatility in the model. First, the range of volatility uncertainty, 
which is governed by the volatility parameters (!!!!!) in the model, will clearly affect !!. 
Moreover, the conditional probability of a high volatility state given a BUY order for the 
contract has arrived (!"! ! !"# ), is an equally important term that decides the level of 
implied volatility of each option contract. It can be easily shown that the relationship between 
these probabilities associated with either contract is the same as the relationship between their 
respective levels of Probability of Informed Trading (PIN). For example, if !"! ! !"# !
!!! ! !"# , which is the same as !"!! ! !"!!##, then the information asymmetry in both 
contracts is identical. In this case, this model will generate an implied volatility skew that can 
be predicted by a reduced version of the model in Cherian and Jarrow (1998). However, as 
shown earlier, the likely optimal strategy for an informed volatility trader in equilibrium 
would lead to a higher level of information asymmetry in volatility for the OTM contract. 
When !"!! ! !"!! (equivalent to !"! ! !"# ! !!! ! !"# ), the model produces a skew 
level that is greater than the case of homogeneous information asymmetry. It is important to 
                                                
11 This relationship between !"!! and !"! ! !"#  can be proved using the property that probabilities add up to one. 
An example of this proof can be found in appendix.  
!
+,-./01!
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note that the more the probability of Contract-1 exceeds the probability of Contract-2, the 
greater the implied volatility skew. Hence given the same volatility parameters, the degree of 
volatility skewness is governed by the size of the information risk differentials.12 Figure 9 
demonstrates the effect of heterogeneous information risk on the IV smile. To simulate Figure 
9, it is assumed that the informed volatility trader’s strategy is determined based on the 
parameters in previous examples, and the market condition is such that !=0.4 and !!=0.4. 
The blue volatility smile is calculated using the priors of ATM Contract-1 (!!! ! !"# ) for 
all strikes. The red dotted line represents the shape of the IV smile obtained by using the 
priors of ATM Contract-1 (!!! ! !"# ) for strike prices less than and equal to 30, but using 
the priors of OTM Contract-1 (!!! ! !"# ) for OTM strike prices greater than 30. It is clear 
in this hypothetical simulation that under heterogeneous information asymmetry, because 
there is higher information risk in OTM contracts, the OTM options will be priced much 
higher than in the case of identical information asymmetry, resulting in a greater implied 
volatility skew.  
  
                                                
12 It should be noted that effect of information risk differentials on implied volatility skew can also be partly 
attributed to the non-linearity of the B-S formula in the strike price. 
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Figure 9. Implied Volatility Smile under Heterogeneous Information Asymmetry 
This figure demonstrates an example of different shapes of implied volatility smiles under two information 
structures. To generate this graph, I first obtain the information risk in probabilities of ATM and OTM contracts 
using the parameters in the standard example. Then, I use only the information risk in the ATM contract to simulate 
option IV in the blue line; I plot the red line with the ATM information risk for strikes less and equal to 30 and use 
the OTM information risk to simulate option prices for strikes greater than 30. 
 
Because the value of !! directly relates to the relative information asymmetry, which 
depends on informed trader’s action predicted by the model, I will carefully provide intuitions as 
well as examples to illustrate the new predictions of this model. In particular, I am going to 
discuss how the evolution of the information structure and the liquidity hedger’s preference lead 
to different equilibrium actions and prices that have a significant impact on the shape of the 
implied volatility skew. For instance, if the equilibrium results in a higher fraction of informed 
investors in the total trading volume of the OTM option contract than in the ATM contract, the 
difference in implied volatility between these two contracts will be greater than if the 
concentration of informed investors is the same for both contracts. 
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Proposition 3.1: 
Given the same volatility uncertainty, a higher degree of heterogeneity in information 
asymmetry between OTM and ATM contracts will lead to a greater implied volatility skew. 
The intuition behind this proposition is quite straightforward. Because implied volatility 
is an increasing function in option price, other things being equal, the market with greater 
difference in information risk between contracts will price an OTM contract higher in 
equilibrium, resulting in a greater IV skew. Figure 10 is a simulated example of implied 
volatility skew as defined in equation (22) and Figure 8, where we can see that the skewness is 
positive for all parameter values. More importantly, if we compare Figure 10 against the adjacent 
Figure 11, where the difference in information asymmetry (!"!! ! !"!!) is plotted under the 
same scale of ! and ! axis, we clearly observe the linkage between the slope of the implied 
volatility skew and the degree of heterogeneity in information asymmetry as suggested in 
Proposition 3.1.  
The implication of this proposition also provides an alternative explanation to some 
existing empirical findings regarding the correlation between bid-ask spreads and the slope of the 
IV smile. In addition to the positive relationships between the IV skew and the difference in 
information asymmetry across strike prices, a higher information risk will also lead to a greater 
spread for an OTM contract (details of the spread discussion can be found in the next section). 
Therefore, the difference in information asymmetry between option moneyness serves as the 
linkage between the IV skew options and the difference in their spreads. This prediction is 
consistent with the evidence in Peña, Rubio and Serna (1999), in which they document a 
statistically significant relationship between the difference in option spreads and the slope of the 
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IV smile.13 
                                                
13 However, Peña, Rubio and Serna (1999) have a different hypothesis for this relationship in their paper. They 
conjecture that the larger spread represent higher transaction cost in an OTM contract, which leads to greater 
implied volatility. 
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Figure 10. Impact of Market Condition on IV Skew 
 
The skewness, or the slope of the implied volatility 
smile, is plotted against different parameter values; 
standard parameter values. 
 
Figure 11. Impact of Market Condition on Difference 
in Information Asymmetry 
The difference in information risk (PIN1 -PIN2) is 
plotted against different parameter values. 
 
Figure 12. Impact of Overall Concentration of 
Informed Trader on IV Skew 
The level of skew is plotted against values of ! for 
three different values of !!. 
 
Figure 13. Impact of Behavior of Liquidity Hedger on 
IV Skew 
The level of skew is plotted against values of !! for 
three different values of !. 
           
In order to explore the relationship between the implied volatility skew and the market 
environment in further detail, let us look at Figures 12 and 13, where the two-dimensional 
snapshots of the skewness graph in Figure 10 are presented. First, it should be noted that we 
observe a kink in Figure 12 because all informed investors’ orders might be traded in the OTM 
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contract for some parameter values sustaining a boundary equilibrium. In those circumstances 
when ! increases, the optimal strategy in the OTM contract for the informed trader,!!!!, does not 
change initially (stays at 1); this will only increase the information asymmetry and the price of 
option Contract-1 while the price of Contract-2 remains unaffected. So a higher ! widens the 
discrepancy of information asymmetry between contracts and increases the slope of the smile. 
However, as ! rises further, we move to interior equilibrium at which informed traders will 
participate in both contracts. In this case, the more overall level of informed traders, the higher 
probability of investing in Contract-2 in equilibrium. This secondary effect will decrease 
(increase) the information asymmetry in Contract-1 (Contract-2), which reduces the 
heterogeneity of the implied volatility between the two contracts. Therefore, the volatility skew 
decreases with ! for interior equilibrium solutions. One implication of this result is that the 
model predicts a decrease in the implied volatility skew during the days leading up to an 
important announcement day provided the market is in an interior equilibrium, as the overall 
level of informed traders tends to increase before announcement periods. As for the relationship 
between skewness and the liquidity hedger’s behavior, previous results indicate that when a 
liquidity investor’s investment preference shifts to OTM Contract-1, the information asymmetry 
will fall in both contracts. Therefore, the relative magnitude of change will have a consequential 
impact on the shape of the smile. Figure 13 shows that whenever the equilibrium solution is 
NOT at the boundary (i.e., ! ! !!! ! !), the skewness of the option market is increasing with the 
hedger’s probability of choosing OTM Contract-1 while both options’ prices are falling. 
However, for low values of !, the slope of the smile might initially increase as both prices fall. 
Yet as soon as the equilibrium solution moves to the boundary where the informed investor only 
trades in Contract-1, any further increase in !! will only reduce the information asymmetry—and 
  45 
thus the price—of Contract-1 while increasing both the information asymmetry and the price of 
Contract-2; thus, the volatility skew will begin to decrease. Overall, any changes in exogenous 
market conditions that lead to variations in Probability of Information Trading in each 
moneyness contract could result in different level of skewness. For example, consider the 
empirical implication of Proposition 3.1 on the cross-section features of the IV skew. If there are 
two stocks with very similar prices and volatility uncertainty (or two currency pairs with similar 
exchange rates and volatility in the case of foreign exchange markets), but the options of one 
asset attracts a significantly higher population of informed volatility investors (relative to 
liquidity hedgers) than the options of the other asset. The level of heterogeneity between 
information risks across the strike for the two corresponding option series would then be 
different, which means that one series will have a higher skew than the other. 
As discussed earlier, equation (20) also suggests that volatility uncertainty in the market 
(governed by parameter !!!!!) plays an important role in determining the exact price, thus the 
level of implied volatility. In fact, changes in volatility parameters will also affect the IV skew in 
two steps. Firstly, there is the direct price effect, as the values of !! !! !!  and !! !! !!  will be 
affected. Secondly, this will also affect the equilibrium prices, thus the IV skew, through the 
information structure of the option series. More importantly, the magnitude of the latter depends 
crucially on the conditions of each market. Figure 14 illustrates the effect of change in volatility 
uncertainty on the IV skew with a numerical example. As the range of uncertainty (measured by 
! ! !) increases, we can see that the level of IV skew increases in the market represented by the 
red line, where !=0.1, !!=0.8, and the average PIN difference between OTM and ATM contracts 
is 0.0649. In contrast in the market condition represented by the blue line, where !=0.6 and 
!!=0.8, the average degree of heterogeneity in information asymmetry is at a much higher level 
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of 0.2618; we see that an increase in the range of volatility uncertainty will actually decrease the 
level of IV skew. From Figure 14, we see that due to the unique feature of this model, the 
implied volatility skew is jointly determined by volatility parameters and the structure of 
information risk. Not only will the equilibrium information structure across strikes result in a 
higher absolute level of IV skew, but the information risk differentials between the option 
contracts also has the potential to influence the degree to which a change in volatility uncertainty 
can affect implied volatility skew. This empirical implication will be further examined in detail 
in the following chapter. 
  
Figure 14. Impact of Volatility Uncertainty on IV Skew 
This figure shows how changes in volatility uncertainty (measured by ! ! !) affect IV skew under different market 
conditions. The blue line represents a case that the average difference in Probability of Information Trading between 
OTM and ATM contracts is 0.2618; the red line represents the case that this difference is 0.0649.  
 
2.4.4 Bid- Ask Spread 
Information risk has long been regarded as an important factor in determining the bid-ask 
spread in financial markets. A number of theoretical papers, beginning with Glosten and 
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Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987), model the relationship between information 
asymmetry and bid-ask spread equity markets. Extensions of these structural models are also 
used to address specific issues in the financial markets. For example, Cherian and Jarrow (1998) 
develop an asymmetric information model to better understand the relationship between 
information risk and option market spreads. In this model, I attempt to contribute to this 
literature by theoretically illustrating the role of volatility information trading in the spread 
structure of option markets. Specifically, I will demonstrate how the heterogeneity in the 
information asymmetry across option contracts affects the relationship between their spreads. We 
know from standard market microstructure theories that factors such as information risk and 
market liquidity tend to influence the bid-ask spreads of financial securities. For financial 
markets such as option markets, in which you have more than one security being traded, it would 
be interesting to investigate if the spreads for different option contracts are inter-connected, and 
moreover, how does such connection reacts to parameter changes in this model. 
Results from previous sections have shown that in equilibrium, relative information 
asymmetry about volatility can be considerably different between the contracts due to the 
strategic interaction between the informed trader and the market maker. According to 
Proposition 1.4, this model predicts that an ATM contract always has information risk that is less 
or equal to the risk of an OTM contract. Because volatility uncertainty is a risk that cannot be 
easily hedged away by the market maker, the information structure within the same option series 
should therefore determine the spread structure of these options. It would be natural to expect 
that the spread structure is consistent with previous findings: a bid-ask spread for an OTM option 
should be higher than an ATM option due to the greater information risk for the market maker; 
furthermore, the spread of Contract-i should increase with ! and decrease with !!. The section 
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below attempts to confirm these conjectures. Finally, I attempt to shed light on the relationship 
between relative information asymmetry and the spread difference across strikes, thus answering 
some practical questions such as whether an increase in overall level of informed volatility 
traders will increase or reduce the spread difference between the contracts. 
To establish the bid-ask spread in this market, I am going to first derive the bid-price as 
the conditional expectation of call prices in a very similar fashion as the ask-price, but the 
condition is that given the market maker receives a SELL order: 
!! ! ! ! !! !! !"##  
! !" ! !"## ! !! !! !! ! !" ! !"## ! !! !! !!  
!
!! ! !!
!!! ! ! !! ! !!
! !! !! !! !
!!! ! !! ! !!
!!! ! ! !! ! !!
! !! !! !! "
The informed investor attempts to maximize total profit by selling options in a low volatility 
state, ! ! !: 
!"!!! !
!!!
!!
!! ! !! ! !
!!!
!!
!! ! !! ! ! 
!! !!!!!!! ! !! ! !"
In equilibrium, the optimal strategy and bid-prices are shown below:  
!!
!!
!
!!!!! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
! ! ! ! !!!! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
!! ! ! !! !
!!!!!! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
! !!!!! ! !! ! ! ! !! !
!
 
 ( 23 ) 
!! !
! ! ! !!
!!!
!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
! !! ! !
!!!
!! ! ! ! ! !!
!!!
!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
! !! ! "  ( 24 ) 
 
Therefore, the equilibrium spread for each option contract is characterized as below:  
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 !"#$%!! ! !!
! ! !!
!  ( 25 ) 
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!! ! ! ! ! !!
!!!
!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
! !! ! !
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!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
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! ! ! !!
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!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
! !! ! !
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!! ! ! ! ! !!
!!!
!! ! ! ! ! ! !!
! !! !  
 
 
 
Figures 15 and 16 depict the spread level of each individual contract for a range of 
parameter values. The conventional results from existing theories still hold, but with minor 
differences. Namely, the model projects that the spreads for both options will increase with !, 
which increases information asymmetry, but this only happens for the interior equilibrium. The 
spread remains unchanged for Contract-2 in boundary equilibrium because the information risk, 
being the only factor that affects the spread in this model, does not change in these cases. 
Additionally, both spreads decrease with !!, which measures the concentration of informed 
traders in that contract. As long as the economy is in interior equilibrium, this prediction is again 
consistent with previous results. 
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Figure 15. Equilibrium Spread of Contract-1 
This figure shows the predicted spread for Contract-
1. The vertical z-axis is the ask-price. Left horizontal 
axis is the value of !; right horizontal axis is the 
value of !!. 
 
Figure 16. Equilibrium Spread of Contract-2 
This figure shows the predicted spread for Contract-
2. The vertical z-axis is the ask-price. Left horizontal 
axis is the value of !; right horizontal axis is the 
value of !!. 
 
I next consider the relationship between the spreads in ATM and OTM options. Because 
the absolute values of option prices usually vary significantly across contracts with different 
strikes. I use two different variables—percentage spread and implied volatility spread— to show 
a meaningful analogy across contracts.  
Define percentage spread as:  
 !"#$%!!! !
!!
! ! !!
!
!
! !!
! ! !!
!
  ( 26 ) 
 
Define implied volatility spread as:  
 !"#$%&'!!"#$%&#&'!!"#$%!! ! !! ! !!  ( 27 ) 
 where !! and !!is the implied volatility derived from Ask 
and Bid price, respectively. 
 
 
First of all, Figures 17 and 18 show that the spread for OTM call options is always 
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greater than the contract with a smaller strike price in equilibrium, regardless of which 
measurement is used. This is consistent with the empirical observation that the spread of OTM 
contracts is usually much greater than the spread of ATM contracts; it is a direct consequence of 
the prediction that OTM contracts have greater information asymmetry in equilibrium. Secondly, 
Figure 17 shows that as the overall probability of informed traders in this economy increases, the 
disparity between the spread enhances. Whereas such difference in percentage spreads between 
contracts shrinks as the preference of the hedger shifts into Contract-1. But what is intriguing is 
that if we look at the difference in implied volatility spread in Figure 18, it displays a completely 
different pattern from the percentage spread difference. It initially increases with the total 
percentage of the informed investor in the market but decreases after reaching a peak. The effect 
of relative market liquidity from hedgers on the difference in implied volatility spread is even 
more complex. Notice, however, that these characteristics are very similar to what is shown for 
the implied volatility smile and the difference in information asymmetry in Figures 10 and 11. 
Intuitively, as the relative information asymmetry converges between the two contracts, the 
degree of information risk that market makers face in the two contracts becomes very similar; 
because the risk that market maker has exposure to is essentially only the volatility risk, the bid-
ask spread obtained using implied volatility as the measurement of option expensiveness is well 
suited to reflect the compensation for the market maker’s exposure to such risk. However, due to 
the non-linearity of option prices across strike prices, the cheaper absolute price of the OTM 
contracts is much more sensitive to percentage measurement, meaning that a small change in 
price could lead to a large change in terms of percentage. While the difference in volatility 
information risk between contracts reduces as ! increases, the absolute level of information 
actually increases in both contracts, as does the price of both contracts. Therefore, the higher 
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sensitivity for the much cheaper OTM contract could have its spread affected relatively more 
than the ATM contract (percentage-wise), despite the fact that the difference in the risk has been 
reduced.  
 
Figure 17. Difference in Percentage Spread between 
Contract-1 and Contract-2 
This figure shows the predicted percentage spread of 
the two option contracts - !"#$%!!! ! !"#$%!!!. 
The vertical z-axis is the size of spread difference. 
Left horizontal axis is the value of !; right horizontal 
axis is the value of !!.  
 
 
 
Figure 18. Difference in Implied Volatility Spread 
between Contract-1 and Contract-2 
This figure shows the predicted implied volatility 
spread of the two option contracts - !! ! !! !
!! ! !! . The vertical z-axis is the size of spread 
difference. Left horizontal axis is the value of !; right 
horizontal axis is the value of !!. 
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CHAPTER 3 Behavior of Volatility Traders & Heterogeneous Information Asymmetry  
3.1 Introduction 
Black (1975) is the first to suggest the idea that an informed trader could take advantage 
of the higher leverage in option markets when making investment decisions. Since then, a number 
of related topics have attracted increasing attention in the literature. Firstly, there is this an active 
discussion over whether directional information investors trade in option markets and the extent 
to which this affects the pricing discovery and the market microstructure between the two markets 
[Stephan and Whaley (1990), Amin and Lee (1997), Easley, O’ Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Chan, 
Chung, and Fong (2002), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), Cao, Chen, and Griffin 
(2005), and Pan and Poteshman (2006)]]. While the general consensus among these studies seems 
to agree on the existence of informed directional traders in option markets, the results are mixed 
in regard to their ability to influence option prices. Secondly, another area that has generated 
many thoughts is the research regarding the behavior of informed investors in the option markets. 
What makes it a fascinating topic is that in option market there are numerous option contracts for 
the informed traders to choose from, and each contract has its unique characteristics while still 
being linked to one another very closely. Easley, O’ Hara, and Srinivas (1998) provide a 
theoretical framework suggesting that informed traders will optimize their investment by 
considering the tradeoffs between leverage, liquidity, and transaction cost. They demonstrate a 
number of conditions under which a ‘pooling’ equilibrium will exist, a case where informed 
directional investors trade in both stock and option markets. However, current empirical studies 
on this topic are at best inconclusive. For example, evidence from Kaul, Nimalendran, and Zhang 
(2004) and Chakraverty, Gulen and Mayhew (2005) leads to completely opposite conclusions. 
However, many of these works aim to better understand the market microstructure of option 
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markets by investigating the role of directional information traders in the options market. Because 
the existence of volatility information trading [Ni, Pan, Poteshman (2008)] presents a unique type 
of volatility risk that cannot be easily hedged by the market makers,14 such risk should play a 
more pivotal role in the pricing the efficiency of option markets than directional information risk. 
Therefore, it seems necessary to take a more systematic approach to examine the relationship 
between volatility information trading and the market microstructure of option markets to obtain 
a more nuanced overall picture.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, my theory has very interesting implications for the behavior of 
informed volatility traders and consequently the structure of information asymmetry in option 
markets. A fundamental feature of options is that for two option contracts with the same 
underlying stock but varying strike prices, the Out of The Money (OTM) options create higher 
implicit leverage for informed volatility traders. There is a natural incentive for them to utilize as 
much of this higher leverage as possible if market conditions cooperate. So high liquidity in 
those these OTM contracts is crucial for the informed traders to take full advantage of the higher 
leverage. If the liquidity is insufficient for the informed traders to hide their orders, market 
makers will deem the order flow to be too toxic and thus increase the price to protect their own 
interests. The model predicts that in equilibrium, information asymmetry will always be higher 
for the OTM option contract, even though there are potentially two possible types of equilibrium. 
In the case of boundary equilibrium, the OTM option has enough liquidity to accommodate the 
volume of informed trading; there will be no information asymmetry for options with a strike 
that is closer to the stock price. If the market is in an interior equilibrium, informed volatility 
                                                
14 Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) conjectures that volatility risk is a unique risk for market makers in option markets 
because volatility uncertainty affects their ability to continuously rebalance their positions. 
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traders have to split their strategies between contracts to maximize their expected profit. 
However, the optimal strategy of the informed trader will also result in an equilibrium that 
information asymmetry in the OTM contract is higher. If this prediction is proved to be 
empirically true, it provides a direct theoretical foundation for and is consistent with evidence 
documented in a number of previous empirical studies. For example, Pan and Poteshman (2006) 
find that the same type of information embedded in more OTM option contracts has greater 
predictive power than in ATM options. This is only true if the degree of information asymmetry 
is greater for OTM options, as predicted by the model in this paper.  
In this section, I attempt to contribute to the current literature by empirically testing the 
model’s prediction on the behavior of volatility information traders in option markets as they try 
to strategically maximize their ‘leverage’ across contracts against market makers. Moreover, 
unlike most of the previous empirical studies (in which the behavior of informed trader is 
indirectly inferred from examining price discovery processes or spread movements), I utilize the 
theoretical model I established in the previous chapter (as well as intra-day trading data from the 
Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE)) to address this issue by directly estimating the level 
of information asymmetry embedded in the option markets. More importantly, the structure of 
the model allows me to separate the potential heterogeneity of information risk across contracts 
of different strike prices, which helps us to better understand the relationship between the 
strategic behavior of informed volatility traders, information asymmetry, and the numerous 
pricing features in the option markets. The estimation methodology is closely related to the work 
by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and (1997), and Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara 
(2012); I discuss the details of this method in later sections.  
I find that the empirical results regarding the structure of information risk within the 
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option series is largely consistent with the theoretical prediction from the previous chapter. The 
OTM options, on average, have a higher degree of information asymmetry than the ATM 
options.  
 
3.2 The VPIN Variable for Option Market 
A direct test on the behavior of informed volatility traders and the equilibrium 
information risk structure of option markets would be estimating the degree of information 
asymmetry embedded in various groups of option contracts. The traditional approach for 
estimating information asymmetry in market microstructure research typically involves a 
maximum likelihood approach.15 This method estimates the parameter values associated with the 
structural model to obtain the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) variable. More recently, 
Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012) have developed a new methodology to estimate 
information asymmetry (or flow toxicity) in a high frequency trading environment. They use a 
non-parametric approach to estimate the Volume-synchronized Probability of Informed Trading 
(VPIN).16. I am going to adapt this VPIN approach to estimate the probability of informed 
volatility trading in the option markets. Among its many advantages over the likelihood 
estimation approach, some of them are particularly relevant in light of this model. Firstly, the 
non-parametric feature of VPIN calculation is extremely appealing in this case because the 
number of parameters in the structural model is too many for the conventional likelihood 
estimation. Secondly, the VPIN methodology allows for a time-varying estimation of 
information asymmetry, whereas the conventional maximum likelihood approach assumes stable 
                                                
15 Please see Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and (1997) for the details of this estimation method. 
16 Patent has been applied for their VPIN calculation algorithm. 
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parameter values over a certain period. This is particularly useful in later sections when I attempt 
to empirically examine the relationship between option prices and information asymmetry. Last 
but not least, the model in this paper does not specify the regularity of the information event, nor 
the time interval between the beginning of the game and when the volatility information is 
revealed to the public. Volatility information in the market can occur irregularly, and the extent 
to which it draws market attention can also vary. Such information can depend on the level of 
surprise of a data or earnings announcement, in which case informed traders start to gradually 
inject flows into the market a few days ahead of the announcement. Other volatility information 
can be related to market activities and sentiments; in this case, the realization of such information 
might be available to the public within the day. The fact that VPIN uses a volume-bucketing rule 
means that more weight is assigned to information associated with higher volume and that 
volatility information will be weighed in as it happens rather than become diluted over a 
specified time interval. For instance, consider two sets of options with two different underlying 
stocks; one of them has information embedded in trading volume on a daily basis, while the 
other one has either multiple information based trading episodes during a day or no information 
trading for many days. The manifestation of the former scenario would be stable daily volume 
across days; for the latter, one would see very large volume in days where information trading 
occurs but quiet trading activities for the other days. If I were to calculate the average probability 
of information-based trading over one month, the volume bucketing rule will provide a more 
consistent estimation between the two sets of options than using clock time as a basis. 
 
3.3 Estimation Methodology 
Recall that in Chapter 2, the probability of informed trading for each option category of 
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contracts can be characterized by model parameters as 
!!!
!
!!!
!!! !!! !!
!
!!!"#$"!!"#$%$&'(!!"#!!"#$%&!$!!!
!!!"!#$!!"#$"!!"#$!!"#!!"#$%&!$!!!
. Moreover, similar to most of information-based 
market microstructure models, the source of this expected order imbalance comes directly from 
the presence of the informed investor; in this model, the informed volatility trader. Follow the 
work of Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012), the expected value of this imbalance for a 
given trading period should be ! !"#$!! ! !"##!!!  as shown by Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and 
Wu (2008). Furthermore, because the expected total order size is simply the sum of Buy and Sell 
orders, we can express the VPIN for each option contract as:  
 !"#$ !
! !"#$!! ! !"##!!!
! !"#$!! ! !"##!!!
!
!"#$!! ! !"##!!!
!
!!!
!"
  ( 28 ) 
"
Because VPIN adopts a volume bucketing rule, ! is the index for each of the equally sized 
volume buckets, and the expected sum of Buy and Sell orders is fixed as ! for each period.  
Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012) also introduced a new method to classify 
Buy and Sell volumes in the high-frequency trading environment. Although trading activity in 
the option markets has been expanding rapidly, it was still far from a high-frequency trading 
venue in 2003. Many of the difficulties in identifying Buy or Sell volumes in a high frequency 
world associated with using conventional approaches is therefore unlikely to persist in the option 
markets. Therefore, I will adopt a slightly modified Lee-Ready algorithm (1991) for the 
classification of non-market maker orders.  
The size of each volume bucket ! and the number of baskets ! for each estimation period 
needs to be exogenously determined. Ideally, I would like to have sufficiently high daily trading 
volumes such that both !!!"#!! can be chosen to be reasonably large for representing a one-day 
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equivalent estimate of the VPIN. For example, if ! equals 50 and ! is one-fiftieth of the average 
daily volume for a particular set of option contracts, then on a day of average volume the VPIN 
at the closing could effectively correspond to the daily probability of information-based trading. 
Unfortunately in this case, because the options market is not a high frequency environment, the 
average daily volume is relatively small, with large deviations across different equities. To 
illustrate the estimation results, I use ! ! !"#$!%#!!"#$%!!"#$%&!! ! !" as an initial 
specification.17 
In order to estimate the VPIN for the options market, option contracts are divided into 
two moneyness categories, according to their strike price and the prevailing underlying stock’s 
price at any moment in time. For Call options, if !!!!" ! !
!
! ! ! !!!, they are in the At-The-
Money (ATM) category (or Near-The-Money (NTM) category); if !
!
! ! ! !!!, these options 
belong to the higher leveraged, Out-of-The-Money (OTM) category.  Following the same 
principle, if !!!!" ! !! !!
!
! !!! for Put options, these are in the ATM or NTM category; if 
!!
!!
!
! !!!, these would be OTM Put options.  
 
3.4 Data & Sample Selection 
To estimate the VPIN of the options market, I will primarily use two intra-day datasets 
from the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE): tick-by-tick quotes data and trades data, both 
including the 45 most active equity option series over the period from January to June 2003. The 
datasets cover the entire range of individual option contracts in various types, strike prices, and 
                                                
17 There is no specific reason for this choice of parameters other than that I feel this combination will provide the 
best balance between the number and the quality of estimations. Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012) use a 
combination of V equal to one-fiftieth of daily volume and n equal to 40.  
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maturities. The trades dataset also includes the underlying stock price at the time of each trade, 
but for two months this variable is missing. I replace the missing portion of this variable by 
merging NYSE TAQ data with the option data. 
The sample will only contain contracts that have expiration dates of less than eight 
months because the trading activity significantly decreases as the duration of the contracts is 
extended. Another feature of option markets is that the trading activity explodes as a security 
draws near its maturity, ; both investors and market makers trade heavily to rebalance their 
portfolio and inventory positions before option settlement. Therefore, as a common practice, 
securities that expire in less than 5 days are excluded from the sample. Finally, since the trading 
activities appeared to be quite low in the data, despite they are being the most traded group of 
options during the period, if a particular group of options has fewer than 60 trading days with at 
least one transaction recorded during a day, the entire set of options with the same underlying 
equity will be excluded from the VPIN calculation.  
Trading orders are identified as Buy or Sell orders using a reduced version of the Lee-
Ready Algorithm against the quotes data. Specifically, if the trade price is above the mid-point of 
the prevailing quotes, it is treated as a buy order, and as a sell order if it is below the mid-point. 
When the trade price happens to be equal to the mid-point, the order is treated differently from 
the Lee-Ready Algorithm, which would compare the current trade price with the previous one.18 
Since the price of an option as a derivative can be affected by many factors such as underlying 
price and time between trades, it is entirely possible that the second stage of Lee-Ready 
algorithm might create more misclassifications if it is applied directly to the options market. 
                                                
18 Specifically, if the tick price increases, it is assumed that the trade is Buy order initiated,; and if tick price 
decreases, the trade is considered to be a Sell order; if the price is unchanged from the previous one, then this 
process continues until a change of price is found. 
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Therefore, in this paper, whenever a trade price is equal to the mid-point it will be excluded from 
the sample. However, in market microstructure literature as well as for practitioners, precisely 
matching trades records with quotes data has always been more of an art than a science. 
Fortunately, options trading has yet to become a high-frequency world. The prevailing quotes are 
paired up with each transaction by the interval of minutes. Average bid and ask prices are used if 
multiple quotes were available during the same minute interval; however, a brief examination of 
the dataset suggests this is indeed a rare scenario.  
In the final sample, the maximum number of trading days available for any option 
category is 125 trading days, using the parameter combination of 
! ! !"#$!%#!!"#$%!!"#$%&!! ! !" , implies that a maximum of 125 volume-baskets would be 
created for an option category that recorded a transaction every single day during the sample 
period.#$ Therefore, this option category will have approximately 85 VPIN estimates. Table 2 
provides a summary of the data used in the VPIN estimation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 There are no specific reasons for the choice of parameter values other than trying to balance the total number of 
estimated VPINs and the quality of estimation. Reducing ! and ! increases the total number of estimates at the cost 
of increasing the noise in each estimation. The combination of average daily volume and 40 buckets is consistent 
with the parameter choice in Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012). When estimation is performed using 
different parameter combinations, none of the qualitative conclusions from the presented results are affected. 
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Table 2. Summary of VPIN Estimation 
This table reports values from January 2003 to June 2003 of a number of variables for different option types and 
categories. Only option categories with more than 60 trading days with at least one transaction recorded during a day 
are included. Options with maturities of less than 5 days and more than 8 months at the beginning of the day are 
removed from the sample. Number of VPINs to be estimated are based on parameter combination of ! !
!"#$!%#!!"#$%!!"#$%&! ! ! !". 
(( (( Puts Calls 
(( (( OTM ATM ATM OTM 
No. of stocks 41 41 42 42 
Avg. No. of trading days 115.2 119.6 119.3 122.1 
Avg. daily volume 444.0 852.0 1562.9 664.4 
No. of transactions 98341 258738 573543 227497 
Avg. moneyness (K/S) 81.2% 97.5% 102.7% 123.9% 
Avg. maturity 92.8 53.3 63.1 115.9 
No. of VPINs estimated 3084 3262 3330 3448 
 
3.5 Results 
The VPIN calculation procedure mostly follows the algorithm defined in Easley, Lopez 
de Prado, and O’Hara (2012); minor adjustments are made to accommodate the structure of the 
data in this model. As stated earlier, I will present the results with ! as the daily average volume 
for each option category and ! ! !". This parameter choice is equivalent to saying that each 
VPIN is calculated using two months of trading data on average, but of course when information 
events arrive frequently during certain clock-time periods, VPINs are updated much more 
quickly. A summary of VPIN estimations using the various combinations of parameters !!!"#!! 
can be found in the appendix; the results only differ quantitatively rather than qualitatively.20 
                                                
20 I also attempt to estimate the VPINs by using the combined average daily volume of each series as the bucket size 
for both moneyness categories; the  estimation results are still qualitatively consistent with the conclusion. 
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Figure 19. Distribution of VPIN Estimates 
In this figure, the distribution of all VPIN estimates for each option category is presented in these four 
histograms. The parameters used for every option category is V= average daily volume, n=40. 
 
As stated earlier, the VPIN can be viewed as a direct approximation of the probability of 
informed trading in each option category. Figure 19 shows the fitted distributions of VPIN 
estimates for each option category over the entire sample.  The distribution of VPINs for the 
OTM category appears to have a higher mean for both option types; this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that, in equilibrium, OTM option contracts in general contain higher volatility 
information risk than ATM contracts. To determine whether this distribution feature over the 
entire sample is a result of a few individual option series, Figure 20 demonstrates a 
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comparison between the volatility information risk embedded in OTM and ATM contracts of 
each stock. Each point corresponds to a particular stock, with the vertical axis measuring the 
average VPIN of its OTM contracts and horizontal axis being the average VPIN of the ATM 
contracts. A 45-degree line is plotted on both graphs; a point on the left hand side of the line 
indicates that the volatility information risk is higher in OTM options than ATM options for 
that particular stock. The fact that the majority of the points lie on the northwest side of the 
45-degree line reinforces the conclusion that OTM options indeed have higher information 
risk than ATM options for most underlying stocks.
 
Figure 20. OTM VPIN vs. ATM VPIN 
This figure shows the relationship between OTM VPINs and ATM VPINs of the same underlying stock. Each 
point represents one stock, its vertical coordinate represents the mean of OTM VPIN estimates, and its 
horizontal coordinate represents the mean of its ATM VPIN estimates. 
 
To statistically examine this hypothesis, Panel A of Table 3 represents the distribution 
summary of average VPIN estimates for both OTM and ATM options across 45 stocks. 
Notice that regardless of the type of options, the OTM category on average has a much higher 
information risk as measured by the mean and median of VPIN estimates. I subsequently 
perform a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test on the hypothesis that the average VPIN 
estimates for OTM options have a higher median than VPIN estimates for ATM options; the 
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results are shown in Panel B. The p-values strongly reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative, and it clearly indicates that this VPIN estimate is indeed consistent with the 
hypothesis that trading OTM options involves higher information risk than ATM options.  
Table 3. VPIN Estimates and Mann-Whitney Tests  
Panel A presents the means, medians, and standard deviations of VPIN estimates by option type 
(Put/Call) and category. Each VPIN estimate is calculated using V= average daily volume & n=40. Panel 
B shows the results from a Mann-Whitney test with a null hypothesis being both samples from the same 
distribution, which examines whether the distribution of VPIN for OTM options has a higher median 
than the distribution of VPIN for ATM options. 
Panel A: VPIN Estimate Summary for all Option Categories 
  Puts Calls 
  OTM ATM ATM OTM 
Sample Size 41 41 42 42 
Mean 0.7034 0.5765 0.4698 0.6074 
Median 0.7103 0.5705 0.4665 0.6092 
S.D. 0.0997 0.1135 0.0865 0.1168 
 Panel B: Mann-Whitney Test on Option VPIN's 
Sample Size m=41, n=41 m=42, n=42 
P-Value 2.58E-06 2.50E-07 
 
One potential concern of these VPIN estimates is that they might be subject to some form of 
volume bias. Since the sample consists of the most active equity options in terms of total 
trading volume, it is reasonable to claim that information risk as measured by VPIN in OTM 
contracts is higher than ATM contracts is a manifestation of the total trading volume, which is 
an element not modeled in the theoretical framework. To address this issue, Figure 21 plots 
the differences in VPINs between contracts against the average daily total trading volumes. 
Clearly, both the graph and the t-stat of 0.97 on the slope coefficient strongly suggest that the 
heterogeneous information risk captured by VPIN is robust to the size of the overall option 
trading activity.  
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Figure 21. Difference in VPINs between Option Contracts 
This figure plots the difference in average VPIN between the OTM and ATM contracts of each stock 
against the total daily volume of each option series. The equation represents the fitted line and the t-
stat on the slope of this line is shown in the top-right corner. 
 
Of course, we do have to keep in mind that these estimates may potentially over-
estimate the level of volatility information risk if informed directional traders also bring 
significant volume. However, as stated earlier, both media articles and academic literature 
point to the idea that option markets are more likely to be dominated by volatility trading. 
More importantly, since market makers have the ability to hedge directional risk, the presence 
of informed directional traders should have very limited impact on the spread and pricing of 
options in a competitive environment. Therefore, their existence, and thus their trading 
volume, should only create noise in the process of estimating volatility information risk, 
which is a risk that is more difficult to be hedged by market makers. In the following sections 
where I analyze the impact of volatility information asymmetry on spread and implied 
volatility, I present several results that make convincing cases that these VPIN estimates are 
reasonably good proxies for reflecting the relative level of information asymmetry with 
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respect to volatility. 
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CHAPTER 4 Volatility Trading & Option Market Microstructure 
4.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognized that inventory positions and asymmetric information are two 
major sources of risk associated with financial market dealers. The case of inventory position 
risk for equity dealers has been illustrated both theoretically and empirically in existing literature 
[for example, Ho and Stoll (1983) and Stoll (1978)b]. On the other hand, papers such as Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) demonstrate why the existence of 
information asymmetry about future stock values between equity market makers and informed 
investors would result in market makers increasing bid-ask spreads to protect themselves from 
such risk. Despite the mixed empirical results on the behavior of informed directional investors 
in option markets, the complication is the extent to which these risks, with respect to the 
directional movement of the underlying asset, can be hedged away by an attempt to remain a 
delta-neutral position: a common practice with options market makers.  
Some research have attempted to explain the market microstructure in option markets by 
using market frictions, with some success. For example, Hull and White (1987) and Jameson and 
Wilhelm (1992) use option derivatives such as Gamma and Vega to proxy for various factors 
associated with a market maker’s inability to continuously rebalance their positions. Despite 
their serious efforts, market friction alone seems to capture only part of the spread behaviors. For 
example, to the extent that limits of arbitrage affect the bid-ask spread in option markets, it is not 
clear why OTM contracts, which require minimal positions to remain delta-neutral, should have 
a much higher spread size than ATM options.21 
To the best of my knowledge, other than a few theoretical attempts to link option spreads 
                                                
21 For US equity option markets, the proportional spread for OTM contracts in general is greater than ATM options. 
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with volatility information risk, very little has been done to empirically explore the influence of 
volatility information asymmetry on option bid-ask spreads. Because the model developed in 
Chapter 2 utilizes an asymmetric information framework, the theory is able to generate specific 
predictions on the relationship between option spreads and volatility information risk. In this 
section, I empirically investigate the prediction on the role of volatility information trading in 
determining option spreads. I find that volatility information trading is a major source of risk for 
option market makers, as it accounts for a large proportion of variations in option spreads both 
cross-sectionally and dynamically. Moreover, I show that the potential heterogeneity in volatility 
information risk within the same option series also plays an important role in explaining the 
difference between OTM and ATM spreads. 
Another contribution of this part of the dissertation is the ability to directly measure the 
level of information asymmetry using the theoretical framework and unique dataset. Many 
previous empirical works relied on the various measurements of implicit leverage as a proxy for 
information asymmetry, based on the notion that higher leverage attracts more informed 
investors. However, well-accepted theories such as those of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) suggest that the real genesis of information risk is not the absolute 
level of informed traders in a financial market; rather, it is the relative proportion between 
informed and uninformed traders that most concerns market makers. Using VPIN as a direct 
proxy for information asymmetry conveniently solves this problem, and it certainly helps us to 
better understand the relationship between volatility information trading and option market 
microstructure.  
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4.2 Empirical Specification 
According to the theoretical results from Chapter 2, the spread of an option contract is 
derived as the following:   
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If we assume that in equilibrium, the difference in volatility risk faced by market makers 
between executing a buy order and executing a sell order is sufficiently small, the spread can be 
expressed as:  
 !"#$%!! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !"!!
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What this relationship essentially suggests is that the spread of any option contract at a 
given time is determined by the product of the relative difference in option values at each 
volatility state and the volatility information risk of the corresponding contract. If a conditional 
lognormal distribution is the equilibrium common belief in the market once true volatility is 
revealed, that is, the option’s value is determined by the Black-Scholes formula in the second 
period, then by assuming the volatility parameters in the model as simple linear functions of the 
underlying’s historical realized volatility, the percentage spread of an option contract may be 
expressed as:  
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!"#$%&"' ! !!!! and !" !! !!!  is the 
Black Scholes option value if it has a strike of !! and the future 
volatility is !!. 
 
 
In order to empirically examine the role of information risk in an option’s spread as 
characterized above, I analyze the daily market-opening proportional spread22 of option 
contracts. The advantage of using the market-opening spread is that it is a point of time when 
minimal public information and trading patterns are available to the market maker during a 
normal trading day. Therefore, it provides a great snapshot of the option markets that is closest to 
the scenario described in the static theoretical model, where beliefs are formed based on 
exogenous factors and historical data. Additionally, because a daily estimate of PIN is required 
for this analysis, there are three issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, one should notice that 
when a VPIN is obtained as a direct estimate for the Probability of Information Trading in each 
option group, it is calculated through trading activities on a volume-clock basis, which means 
some trading days in the sample may not have a VPIN estimate; and other days may have 
multiple VPIN estimates. Therefore, I am going to construct a time series of previously estimated 
VPINs to correspond with the average daily spread.  Simply put, the day in which the first VPIN 
is estimated for the option category will be the first daily VPIN observation. If more than one 
VPIN is estimated during a day, the last estimate will be taken; if there does not exists a single 
                                                
22 Due to the non-linearity in Black-Sholes price’s sensitivity to volatility, and the fact that volatility parameters in 
the model are not directly observable, any systematic incorrect assumption on the volatility parameters value could 
lead to large non-linear variations in the predicted dollar spread for options. To this end, since the volatility 
parameters are assumed to take the same simplistic linear form across options, using a proportional spread will help 
to reduce this misspecification risk. When the same test is performed using a dollar spread, the statistical and 
economic significance of independent variables remain very similar to the presented results, but the R-square 
becomes much smaller. 
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VPIN estimate for a trading day, I use the VPIN from the previous day as the best estimate of the 
day. Secondly, because the daily VPIN is constructed based on the information at the end of each 
trading day, the best estimate of information risk a market maker has at the market opening is the 
VPIN estimate from ! ! !. Finally, due to the limitation of data, VPINs are only estimated for 
two moneyness categories of each option series. In order to carry out this analysis, I take the 
average spread across contracts within the same moneyness group, and then investigate the 
average proportional spread of each option moneyness group. Therefore, the main equation I will 
utilize to examine the model’s implication on the option’s spread is the following:  
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where ! denotes the moneyness group, !! !! !! ! !!"#!!"#!; !!!! is the 
number of contracts available in moneyness group ! at time !. 
 
 
Based on the explanation in the previous section, an intuitive way to interpret this 
relationship is that the average opening proportional-spread for each option category is a linear 
function of the multiplicative product between the average percentage difference (in option 
values between two volatility states) and the best estimate of volatility information risk in the 
corresponding option group at the time.  
In addition to volatility information risk, which is the only source of risk included in the 
theoretical model, there are other potential factors that could influence the market microstructure 
and the spread of the options market. To the best of my knowledge, the following are the most 
commonly discussed factors in the existing literature: 
(a) Initial Hedging Cost (IH) 
Option markets dealers face certain transaction costs such as the underlying stock’s bid-
  73 
ask spread whenever they take on and/or liquidate their delta-neutral hedging positions. This cost 
can be approximated by:  
 !" ! !"#  ( 34 ) 
where ! is the proportional spread of the underlying stock, ! is the underlying stock price, and ! 
is the option delta in the B-S-M formula. 
(b) Discrete Rebalancing Cost (RC) 
If the underlying stock’s return follows a log-normal distribution with known volatility, 
an option market maker could in theory dynamically rebalance her portfolio to remain a delta-
neutral position throughout the life of the option contract. However, due to the discrepancy 
between a theoretical frictionless market and the imperfect real world, it is impossible for option 
market makers to continuously rebalance positions without incurring extra cost. I define the 
discrete rebalancing cost in a manner similar to Leland (1985) and Boyle and Vorst (1992):  
 !" ! !!"  ( 35 ) 
where ! is the proportional spread of the underlying stock and ! is the option Vega derived from 
the B-S-M formula. To simplify the calculation, a constant rebalancing period across options is 
assumed.  
(c) Daily Transaction Volume (DV) 
The expected trading volume of options should help to explain an option’s spread in two 
ways. First, it serves as a good proxy for the average order processing cost for market makers. As 
order-processing costs tend to stay constant given a particular transaction, a larger expected 
trading volume should lead to a lower average order processing cost. Second, higher trading 
activity could also lead to a greater likelihood that option transactions will offset each other, thus 
reducing the need for market makers to rebalance their positions in the future. Under both 
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scenarios, one should expect a negative relationship between the average daily volume of options 
and their spread level. 
To control for these factors, each of the variables is added to the regression analysis. The 
average value of these variables is taken if the option contracts belong to the same moneyness 
category. Therefore, I examine the impact of volatility information risk on option spreads after 
controlling for other potential determinants of option spreads by analyzing the following 
equation:  
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4.3 Data & Sample Selection 
Spread Characteristics 
Figure 22 shows the spread structure of two particular stock option series on a particular 
day before filtering the data for regression. What we see from the graph is that the average 
percentage spread is the highest in the most OTM Put options (more than 70% OTM); Call 
options also appear to have a larger spread as the strike price increases. Whereas in general, 
ATM options have the smallest spread for these two stocks.  Another interesting characteristic of 
the figure is that the percentage spread structure also displays a ‘smile’ feature that one typically 
finds in the option’s implied volatility for these two stocks.  
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Figure 22. Spread Structure of Citi Options & GE Options on January 24, 2003. 
This figure shows the average percentage spread of options in each moneyness category for two particular stock 
option series before filtering the data.  
 
Sample Selection 
To stay consistent with VPIN estimation, option contracts are divided into two categories: 
the At The Money (ATM) group consists of contracts that are between 5% In The Money and 
10% Out of The Money (both inclusive); and anything greater than 10% is classified as the Out of 
The Money (OTM) group. Since option contracts with different underlying stocks may have 
different expiration dates throughout the calendar month, and the sensitivity of option values to 
time to maturity increases as the contract approaches its expiring date, I am going to only include 
contracts that have a ‘next-month’23 expiration in order to maintain a reasonable consistency 
across underlying assets and strike prices. To construct the volatility information risk factor for 
each available quoted contract (! ! !"#!! !
!
!!!!
!!! !!! ! !!!! !!! !
!!! !!! ! !!!! !!! !
!!! ! !"#!!!!!!), a 
                                                
23 Specifically, each option series with the same underlying stock in the final sample will contain one expiration 
date—the second nearest expiration date available for each stock. 
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valid VPIN estimate must be available. Because the first estimated VPIN for each option category 
may not be available at the beginning of the sample period (unless 40 volume-baskets were 
accumulated on the first day), only those opening quotes with a valid VPIN estimate at the 
beginning of the day are included. Lastly, if the information related to the underlying stock, such 
as its price at ! ! ! or its historical volatility, is not available in the data for particular days, those 
days are excluded from the final sample. In order to calculate the volatility information risk and 
the control variables as discussed above, a standard no-dividend paying B-S-M formula and its 
derivatives, Delta and Vega, are used. Specifically, to calculate the opening Black-Scholes value 
of each option contract, as well as to determine the option category classification (i.e., whether an 
option is OTM or ATM at the opening), the stock’s closing price from the previous trading day is 
considered to be the value of the underlying asset when the market opens. Among other 
parameters involved in the B-S-M formula, their prevailing values at the beginning of the day are 
applied to the price calculation. A simple equally weighted average is used when calculating the 
mean proportional spread for each moneyness category !, the volatility risk factor for that 
category, as well as all of the control variables. The daily volume variable !!! is the average 
trading volume for category ! of a particular stock obtained from the entire 6-month sample 
period. Because the primary focus of this dissertation is to study the behavior of a volatility 
information trader across strikes and its impact, theoretical and empirical differentials between 
Call and Put options are not explicitly addressed in the structural model. Therefore, the two 
option types are presented and tested separately. 
 
4.4 Summary Statistics  
There are a total of 9,518 ‘option category-day’ of spread observations available after 
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filtering the original data, including 4,651 Put observations. Table 4 provides the summary 
statistics of all the key variables involved in previous specifications. The actual market opening 
proportional spread (Spread%) has an aggregate mean of 0.38, or 38% of the option value (by 
mid-point). Among all the option contract groups observed in the sample, the maximum average 
spread size is 1, indicating that the size of the spread is never greater than the mid-point value of 
contracts in the observed data. The approximation of spread attributes to volatility information 
risk (! ! !"#$) has a distribution that is fairly close to the actual observed spread in terms of 
descriptive statistics, with the mean, minimum, and maximum slightly above the observed; the 
skewness and kurtosis are slightly smaller than the actual spread distribution. The minimum of 
both the Initial Hedging Cost (A!) and the Discrete Rebalancing Cost (B/) is zero, which suggests 
that the differences between the bid and ask prices of those active underlying stocks are very 
small relative to the absolute level of their price, thus translating to almost zero hedging frictions 
as defined earlier. On average, the transaction volume is lower for Put options than for Call 
options. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the filtered sample. Spread% is calculated at market opening; 
proportion spread of the underlying asset is obtained from market closing data from previous day. Volatility 
information risk’s contribution to spread, ! ! !"#$ is calculated based on B-S formula and !!=1.2 times 
historical volatility and !! = 0.8 times historical volatility. Daily Volume is the average number of total contracts 
traded during the entire sample. Panels A through C show the summary statistics for Put options, Call options, 
and all types combined, respectively. 
  Mean Std. Skew Kurt Min Max 
Panel A: Put Options 
Spread% 0.36 0.26 0.74 2.46 0.03 1.00 
! ! !"#$ 0.54 0.32 0.58 2.04 0.13 1.49 
IH 0.02 0.03 3.64 22.48 0.00 0.31 
RC 0.01 0.01 3.40 21.03 0.00 0.11 
DV 724.01 621.67 1.88 6.34 47.59 2951.77 
       
Panel B: Call Options 
Spread% 0.39 0.28 0.67 2.32 0.04 1.00 
! ! !"#$ 0.40 0.17 0.72 2.59 0.15 1.07 
IH 0.02 0.03 3.19 18.78 0.00 0.36 
RC 0.01 0.01 2.99 18.08 0.00 0.11 
DV 954.04 840.38 1.78 6.43 12.00 4422.76 
       
Panel C: Aggregate 
Spread% 0.38 0.27 0.71 2.40 0.03 1.00 
! ! !"#$ 0.47 0.26 1.03 3.26 0.13 1.49 
IH 0.02 0.03 3.39 20.35 0.00 0.36 
RC 0.01 0.01 3.18 19.43 0.00 0.11 
DV 841.63 750.43 1.93 7.20 12.00 4422.76 
 
Table 5 shows the filtered sample means of those variables in Table 4, as well as the B-S 
pricing features broken down by option types and moneyness categories.  
Clearly, the spread size for OTM options is significantly larger than ATM options; this 
characteristic is also reflected in the construction of spread attributes to volatility information 
risk (! ! !"#$).  ! ! !"#$ is larger for OTM options for two reasons. Firstly, since the 
elasticity of change in option value with respect to change in volatility is higher when the strike 
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price is lower (higher) for Put (Call) options; the relative price range ! !  is larger for OTM 
options. Secondly, because OTM contracts contain greater volatility information asymmetry, 
their VPIN is also higher; thus, the joint result for ! ! !"#$. Additionally, as expected, ATM 
options have higher B-S Delta and Vega compared with OTM options. Subsequently, both the 
Initial Hedging Cost and the Rebalancing Cost is slightly higher for ATM options. The average 
trading volume appears to be greater for the ATM category in both option types. What is 
interesting is that both the per dollar Delta and Vega are much larger for OTM options, 
indicating that if the conditional B-S formula is used in the equilibrium, the OTM contracts on 
average provide a higher rate of return, or ‘implicit leverage’, for the informed volatility trader.  
Table 5. Summary Statistics Broken Down by Option Type and Moneyness Category 
This table reports summary statistics from January 2003 to June 2003 of a number of variables for different option 
types and categories. Spread% is calculated at market opening; proportion spread of the underlying asset is obtained 
from market closing data from previous day. Volatility information risk’s contribution to spread, ! ! !"#$ is 
calculated based on B-S formula and !!=1.2 times historical volatility and !! = 0.8 times historical volatility. Daily 
Volume is the average number of total contracts traded during the entire sample. 
 Put Call 
 OTM ATM ATM OTM 
Spread% 0.59 0.16 0.18 0.62 
! ! !"#$ 0.85 0.28 0.27 0.55 
IH 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 
RC 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
DV 483.75 931.62 1409.59 461.27 
Delta  0.16 0.48 0.42 0.21 
Vega 3.24 5.62 5.06 2.95 
Delta/$ 0.33 0.23 0.31 0.44 
Vega/$ 6.49 2.13 3.42 6.19 
 
4.5 Results 
 There is clear evidence that volatility information risk plays a vital role in determining 
option spreads. As shown in column 1 of Table 6, the R-squared in the regression result (when 
including the volatility information risk) alone explains 62% of the variations in the opening 
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proportional spread of option contracts. The estimated coefficient on the volatility information 
risk factor (! ! !"#$) has a t-statistic of 87.75; its value of 0.645 implies that whenever the 
model predicts a one percent increase in option spread due to a change in information asymmetry 
about volatility, the actual observed proportional spread will increase by 0.645 percentage points. 
Another interesting economic interpretation of this coefficient is that it suggests the contribution 
of heterogeneity in information risk between OTM and ATM contracts to their difference in 
proportional spread is approximately 0.082. To obtain this number, recall from the last section 
that, on average the VPIN of OTM Put contracts is greater than ATM Put contracts by 0.1269 
(0.7034-0.5765=0.1269). Because the coefficient on ! ! !"#$ is 0.645, the proportional spread 
difference between option moneyness categories of the same underlying stock is on average, 
0.645*0.1269=0.082, larger than what would have been predicted if the level of volatility 
information risk is identical across the option strike prices. Columns 2-4 display the regression 
results when controlling for some or all of the other factors that may affect the option spreads as 
discussed earlier. The volatility information asymmetry term remains highly significant in all 
regressions even though both the coefficient and t-statistics reduce slightly as more independent 
variables are included, yet the minimum t-statistic is still 66.6. In fact, to interpret the economic 
significance of the coefficient on volatility information risk in the last column of Table 6, where 
all control variables are included, let us consider the average option group in the sample (i.e., 
when all the variables equal to their sample means). The volatility information risk (! ! !"#$) 
accounts for approximately 87.7% of its observed proportional opening spread.24 Among the 
                                                
24 As shown in the summary statistics, the average Put option group has Spread%=0.36, ! ! !"#$=0.54, IH=0.02, 
RC=0.01, DV=724.01. The estimated equation that fits this average group is Spread%=0.0781+0.584*! ! !"#!+(-
2.471)*IH+0.5745*RC+(-4.35e-05)*DV; thus, the contribution of volatility information risk on the total spread is 
!!!"#!!! ! !"#$
!"#$%&'
, which equals 87.7%.  
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estimation results for control variables, the next largest contributor to the spread of the average 
option category is daily volume (DV). Moreover, its estimated coefficient is negative. It is 
consistent with the notion that more frequent trading activity will lower the average processing 
cost and reduce the need to rebalance positions—both would lead to smaller spread. 
Table 6. Volatility Information Risk and Opening Spread of Put Options 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Spread% Spread% Spread% Spread% 
      
! ! !"#$ 0.645** 0.634** 0.605** 0.584** 
 (87.75) (82.15) (74.76) (66.60) IH  -0.444**  -2.471** 
  (-4.993)  (-5.951) 
RC   -1.225** 5.745** 
   (-4.808) (4.794) DV   -4.34e-05** -4.35e-05** 
   (-10.78) (-10.83) Const 0.00849 0.0219** 0.0692** 0.0781** 
 (1.833) (4.102) (9.854) (10.91) 
     Observations 4,651 4,651 4,651 4,651 
R-squared 0.624 0.626 0.634 0.637 
This table reports the regression results of daily Put options spread from January 2003 to June 2003. The dependent 
variable is average proportional spread of each option category quoted on the CBOE at the market opening. 
! ! !"#$ is the volatility information risk factor constructed, based on daily VPIN estimation and a linearly 
approximated range for underlying’s future volatility (! ! ). IH and RC are estimates of the Initial Hedging Cost 
and Discrete Rebalancing, based on underlying stock’s spread and B-S option pricing characteristics. DV is the 
average daily volume of each option category during the sample period. T-statistics are shown in parentheses; the 
significance level of coefficients is shown according to criteria: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
Table 7 shows the regression results by estimating the spread specification for Call 
options. The key elements are essentially the same as the results from Table 6. The estimated 
coefficient of volatility information risk factor is statistically significant, and economically it also 
appears to be the clear dominant factor in determining the spread structure of Call options, both 
within and across the underlying stock. The regression R-squared is 0.546 in the full 
specification in column 4; although a large number, it is fractionally smaller than the result from 
the Put options.   
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However, it is interesting to note that for both Put and Call options, we see an alternating 
sign for rebalancing cost coefficient (RC), from -1.225 in column 3,when IH is excluded, to 
5.5745 in column 4 in Table 6; and a negative coefficient of initial hedging cost (IH), which is the 
opposite of what one would expect. One possibility is that while initial hedging friction may be 
an important factor in explaining the cross-sectional difference in option spreads, but it suffers 
when intra-option series features are also included in the investigation. Within the same option 
series, because the OTM contracts have a smaller Delta and Vega, the cost related to the hedging 
action is therefore smaller for OTM options; this negative correlation with the observed intra-
spread difference seems to be a contributing reason for these results, despite the empirical 
specification controlling for volatility information risk. Nonetheless, although the primary focus 
of this dissertation is on the impact of volatility information asymmetry, I believe that further 
study on the hedging frictions’ impact on spreads should lead to more interesting conclusions.  
Table 7. Volatility Information Risk and Opening Spread of Call Options  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Spread% Spread% Spread% Spread% 
      
! ! !"#$ 1.187** 1.180** 1.051** 0.976** 
 
(72.18) (69.52) (56.66) (48.27) 
IH  -0.159  -3.535** 
  (-1.685)  (-8.924) 
RC   -0.127 10.56** 
   
(-0.445) (8.580) 
DV   -5.56e-05** -5.36e-05** 
   
(-15.16) (-14.72) 
Const -0.0838** -0.0779** 0.0245* 0.0516** 
 
(-11.72) (-9.777) (2.353) (4.789) 
     Observations 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867 
R-squared 0.517 0.517 0.539 0.546 
This table reports the regression results of daily Call options spread from January 2003 to June 2003. The dependent 
variable is the average proportional spread of each option category quoted on the CBOE at the market opening. 
! ! !"#$ is the volatility information risk factor constructed based on daily VPIN estimation and a linearly 
approximated range for underlying’s future volatility (! ! ). IH and RC are estimates of the Initial Hedging Cost 
and Discrete Rebalancing based on the underlying stock’s spread and the B-S option pricing characteristics. DV is 
the average daily volume of each option category during the sample period. T-statistics are shown in parentheses; 
the significance level of coefficients is shown according to criteria: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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CHAPTER 5 Skewness of Volatility Smile and Information Asymmetry 
5.1 Introduction  
My theory predicts that when volatility information traders behave strategically as 
described in Chapter 2, option pricing features such as the implied volatility smile should be 
affected by the structure of information risk within the same option series. If various aspects of 
the market lead to a higher level of heterogeneity in information asymmetry between OTM and 
ATM contracts of the same underlying asset, not only will this have a direct effect on the IV 
skew as the relative expensiveness of OTM increases, it will also influence how change in 
volatility uncertainty affects the IV skew in equilibrium. To examine whether these predictions 
by the theoretical model are consistent with actual market outcomes, I am going to investigate 
three main hypotheses on the dynamics25 of implied volatility skew in option markets: 
a) The skewness of an option series of a particular asset should be positively related to 
the difference in information asymmetry between option contracts.  
b) If volatility uncertainty is a linear function of historical volatility, a change in the 
historical realized volatility will directly affect the shape of the volatility skew. 
c) The sensitivity of volatility uncertainty’s impact on skewness depends on the 
heterogeneity in volatility information risk between OTM and ATM contracts. 
Previous research on the empirical properties of Implied Volatility Function (IVF), or 
Implied Volatility Smile (IV smile), are mostly dominated by studies on the level or the slope of 
implied volatility in relation to the distribution of the underlying asset. For example, to 
demonstrate the necessary relationship between the observed IVF and the properties of the 
                                                
25 Unfortunately, due to the limitation of data there is not a large enough sample to perform any meaningful cross-
section analysis. It is undoubtedly very interesting for future research to also investigate the empirical implications 
of the model on the cross-section features of option skewness. 
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underlying asset, Anderson, Benzoni, and Lund (2002) show that the combination of randomly 
arriving jumps in security price and stochastic volatility are required to capture the time-series 
dynamics of index returns; Bates (2000) shows that including a jump process into a stochastic 
volatility model can help capture the dynamics of IVF to the extent that parameters must be set at 
unreasonable values, just to mention a couple26. In spite of the increasing effort, they fail to fully 
capture the slope and the dynamics of IVF. Other studies also attempt to explain the dynamics of 
IVF using a variety of existing factors in financial markets. Bollen and Whaley (2004), Gârleanu, 
Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009), and Nordén and Xu (2010) attempt to further study IVF by 
considering its relationship to the demand/liquidity in option markets. Peña, Rubio and Serna 
(1999) and Deuskar, Gupta, and Subrahmanyam (2008) investigate the economic determinants of 
the slope of IVF by using market microstructure variables. However, with the various levels of 
success in previous studies, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no research that directly 
examines the economic significance of a volatility trader’s behavior and the structure of 
information asymmetry on the empirical dynamics of implied volatility smile.  
In this chapter of the dissertation, in addition to testing whether the predictions my 
theoretical model are consistent with real world data, I also attempt to contribute to the empirical 
literature of options IV smile in the following way. First, using US equity options data from the 
Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE), I am the first to document that the difference (or 
heterogeneity) in volatility information risk across option strikes may have a significant impact 
on the shape of the volatility smile. Second, I extend the current understanding on the dynamics 
of the volatility smile by exploring the role of volatility trading in determining the shape of the 
                                                
26 Bollen and Whaley (2004) provide a thorough review on the development of using option-pricing models to 
explain implied volatility smile. 
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IVF. Specifically, I present evidence that the interaction between the cross-section differences in 
the structure of volatility information risk and historical volatility can help to explain the time-
series features of implied volatility smile in the US equity option market. Third, the consistency 
between the empirical results and the theoretical model demonstrates the value of heterogeneous 
volatility information risk as an important and alternative insight to option pricing that is worth 
further exploration. In particular, it may help to facilitate the understanding of puzzles such as 
the under-prediction of volatility skew by stochastic volatility pricing models.  
 
5.2 Empirical Specification 
First and foremost, I will define and explain the construction of the volatility skew 
variable. One way of measuring the shape of volatility skew is to impose structural implied 
volatility functions to obtain an estimate of the curvature.27 But in Nordén and Xu (2010), they 
discuss that such approximation may suffer from several specification biases when the number of 
traded option contracts across moneyness is limited. In this paper, I am going to measure implied 
volatility skew following the spirit of its definition in the theoretical model, as the relative 
distance between OTM implied volatility and ATM implied volatility. Unlike the theoretical 
environment in which there are only two contracts available for each option series, the number of 
quoted option contracts that fall into the Out of The Money (OTM) or At The Money (ATM) 
category is much greater and varies both cross-sectionally and from time to time. In order to 
construct a robust and consistent IV skew measurement, I first measure the relative distance in 
terms of B-S implied volatility between two Put option contracts with the smallest and the largest 
                                                
27 Peña, Rubio and Serna (1999) and Deuskar, Gupta, and Subrahmanyam (2008) both adopt a method of this nature 
to estimate the curvature. 
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strike price among all available contracts belong to the predetermined OTM and ATM 
category.28 To make each measurement of the skewness comparable to one another, I normalize 
the percentage difference by dividing the ‘moneyness distance’ between the two extreme 
contracts. Specifically, for each underlying asset on day !, the implied volatility skew is 
measured by:  
 !"#!! !
!"!"#!! ! !"!"#!!
!"!"#!!
!!"#
!!
!
!!"#
!!
  ( 37 ) 
where !!"# is the strike price of the most OTM contract quoted at day !; thus, 
!!"#
!!
 is a 
measure of option moneyness for that contract at day !, and !"!"#!! is the B-S implied volatility 
of the OTM contract at day !. Analogously, !!"#, 
!!"#
!!
, and !"!"#!! are the values for the strike 
price, option moneyness, and B-S implied volatility of the ATM contract. It should be noted that 
due to the movements of the underlying’s asset price, not only the level of individual implied 
volatilities is affected in a non-linear fashion, the strike price used in the skew calculation may 
also vary over time. However, the normalization approach ensures that the measurement 
skewness remains consistent and robust, both dynamically and across stocks.  
To investigate the hypotheses on implied volatility skew generated by the theoretical 
predictions, I use the VPIN as the proxy for information asymmetry in the option market. 
Following the protocol of previous sections, I transfer the volume-bucket estimated VPIN into a 
daily VPIN measurement by taking the last estimate on days in which there are multiple 
estimates. For days without a valid estimate of VPIN, the value from previous trading day is 
used. However, in addition to the strong autocorrelation between the daily VPIN estimates due to 
                                                
28 The classification of the moneyness category is detailed in a later section. 
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the estimation methodology, it is also unclear how often the volatility information structure is 
likely to change and what is the frequency that market makers update their beliefs. Instead of 
examining the changes of skew on a daily basis, I will test the empirical implications of volatility 
information trading’s impact on the volatility smile by estimating the following equation:  
 
!!"#$! ! !! ! !!!!!!!"# ! !!!!"#$%&'!! ! !!!"#$%&'!!
! !!!!!"# ! !!! ! !!! ! !"!! ! !!! ! !!!! 
 ( 38 ) 
"
In equation (38), the subscript ! denotes an interval of a ten trading day period. !!!!!"# denotes 
the change of historical volatility from period ! ! ! to !. !!"#$%&'!! ! !!"#$!"#!! !
!"#$!"#!!!! !!"#$!"#!!!! ! !"#$!"#!!!!! is the change in the difference between the OTM 
options VPIN and the ATM options VPIN over each period. This variable essentially captures 
the importance of the volatility information trader’s behavior in the option market by measuring 
the difference in volatility information risk between the higher rate of return OTM contracts and 
the ATM contracts. Notice that simply an increase in the participation by informed volatility 
traders in OTM contracts does not necessarily increase the measurement of VPIN difference. The 
difference in information asymmetry between option moneyness, is determined by the 
equilibrium result of informed volatility trader’s strategic behavior and the behavior of market 
makers given the liquidity hedgers’ preference and option contracts characteristics. If 
!!"#$%&'!! is positive, it can be the result of the following situations: the level of volatility 
information risk has increased in OTM contracts; the level of volatility information risk has 
decreased in ATM contracts; both of these scenarios; or the volatility information has increased 
in both categories but the degree of increase is greater for OTM contracts. All of the above imply 
  88 
that the degree of heterogeneity in information asymmetry across strikes has increased from the 
last period. Subsequently, we should expect the slope of volatility smile to increase. To further 
investigate the role of volatility information asymmetry in determining the shape of the smile, I 
take advantage of the third hypothesis derived from the model. I am going to include an 
interactive term !"#$%&'!! ! !!!!!!" in the regression that attempts to capture the sensitivity of 
skew movement to a change in historical volatility in relation to the varying information 
structure of options. If historical volatility is affecting the volatility skew for non-information 
asymmetry reasons, the estimated coefficient on !"#$%&'!! ! !!!!!"# is expected not to be 
significantly different from zero. 
There certainly are investors who trade options for reasons not included in this model. 
While potentially there are information traders who use options to exploit their informational 
advantage on the directional movement of underlying asset, it is not obvious why it would affect 
market makers and the price of options to the extent that it will bias analysis. Not only such 
directional risk can be delta-hedged in the underlying market, there are also many alternative 
vehicles to trade private directional information such as margin trading. However, the option 
market is the only place where investors can trade volatility information. The presence of 
informed directional traders will only create more noise to the effort of isolating behaviors of the 
volatility information trader. On a different note, as shown in previous sections, the behavior of 
an informed volatility trader concerns market makers in many ways. The bid-ask spread of 
options is among the first things that are directly affected as a result of volatility information 
trading. Therefore, it is my view that the documented potential correlation between the shapes of 
the implied volatility smile and the bid-ask spread in the options market are the simultaneous 
consequences of volatility information trading in the option market, rather than a causality 
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relationship. Including option spreads into the test will therefore produce misspecification errors 
and bias the result.  
However, it does seem important to control for any liquidity or demand reasons that 
could potentially affect the IVF. Bollen and Whaley (2004) find that the net demand pressure of 
options has an impact on the implied volatility function as a result of a ‘not perfectly elastic’ 
supply of options. Along a related line, Nordén and Xu (2010) find a positive relationship 
between the relative liquidity difference in strike prices and the slope of the implied volatility 
smile. It is possible that a significant relationship between volatility information asymmetry and 
the skew of IV is driven by liquidity reasons. For example, when there is a large increase in the 
demand pressure of an option series, certain options may become more expensive depending on 
the supply elasticity. However, if this increase in options demand is distributed in an imbalanced 
way across different strikes, it will also affect the estimation of VPINs. Similarly, when the 
relative liquidity between OTM and ATM contracts varies from time to time, it may affect the 
relative volatility information risk measures if the change in liquidity is unbalanced between 
buys and sells (e.g., if OTM option’s liquidity has decreased because there are fewer buying 
orders, this decreases the relative liquidity ratio as well as increases the OTM VPIN; both can 
lead to higher implied volatility skew). I control for net demand pressure and its effect on IV 
skew through two terms—Net Demand and Relative Demand. These control variables are 
constructed by taking the relative difference between buy-initiated orders and sell-initiated 
orders from non-market makers across all strike prices and calculating the relative difference 
between the OTM and ATM net demands, respectively. Specifically:   
!" !
!"#$! ! !"##$!
!"#$! ! !"##$!
  ( 39 ) 
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 ( 40 ) 
 
I control for the relative liquidity between the OTM and ATM contracts through the term 
!", which is calculated according to:  
 !" !
!" !"#$%!!"# ! !" !"#$%!!"#
!" !"#$%!!"# ! !"#$%!!"#
  ( 41 ) 
 
5.3 Data & Sample Selection 
Skew Characteristics 
Figure 23 illustrates the average time-series properties of options IV skew, ATM implied 
volatility, and historical volatility over all the equity options in the data before filtering for 
regression. A revealing characteristic of the graph is that for most part, the volatility skew shows 
an inverse relationship with the ATM implied volatility. This implies that when ATM options 
become less expensive, the implied volatility of OTM options either increases or decreases by an 
amount no more than the ATM options. In addition, another interesting feature from the figure is 
that while historical volatility is mostly higher than implied volatility in ATM options, it also 
displays a much smoother pattern over the sample period. 
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Figure 23. US Equity Options Skew, ATM Implied Volatility, and Historical Volatility from January 2003 to June 
2003 
The average skew, ATM implied volatility, and Historical volatility is obtained by taking the mean value across all 
available stocks before filtering the data. 
 
Sample Selection  
In order to investigate the role of heterogeneous information asymmetry in determining 
the implied volatility skew, I will use previously estimated VPINs to proxy for the information 
risk in each option category. The classification of option categories in the investigation is 
therefore consistent with the classification in the VPIN estimation. Namely, the At The Money 
(ATM) group consists of Put options that have moneyness (!
!
) between 0.9 and 1.05, and 
anything greater than 10% OTM (!
!
! !!!) is classified as in the Out of The Money (OTM) 
group. The intra-day quotes and trades data required to estimate the VPIN are from CBOE; the 
details of the data and sample selection regarding VPIN estimation can be found in the earlier 
section.  
While quoting prices during the trading day requires market makers be able to detect 
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useful information from noise, prices at the market opening are more likely to reflect the best ex-
ante strategy of market makers after they have digested all the information from the previous 
trading day. So market opening option prices are obtained from the first available quotes from 
the CBOE dataset from Jan 2003 to June 2003. Data involving price and other characteristics of 
underlying stock are from the CRSP database. I obtain the 365-day historical volatility from 
OptionMetrics. The interest rate is proxied by the rate of 1-year Treasury bills. 
When calculating the daily skew in equation (37), the implied volatility of each category 
is calculated based on the mid-point of the open bid-ask prices of the two contracts with the most 
extreme strike prices. I will only use the near-term maturity contract with a ‘next-month’ 
expiration date for each of the two strikes, meaning a maturity time between 35 to 63 days. 
Moreover, during the implied volatility calculation, the closing price of the underlying stock 
from the previous trading day is used. Finally, an equal-weighted average on the daily skew is 
taken over a ten-day interval to obtain the average skew for each period !.  
To qualify as an observation for estimating equation (38), every trading day within period 
! must have a valid data point. A trading day is defined to be a valid data point for an option 
series at day ! if: (a) There must be data available to construct the skew variable. (b) A VPIN 
must be available for both OTM and ATM categories to calculate the VPIN difference. (c) There 
must be historical volatility data available for the underlying stock. Option trades data during the 
day are grouped according to the moneyness of the contract at the market opening; all near-term 
contracts in each category are included when calculating trading volume. 
The value of the underlying stock’s return is determined by its cumulative returns over 
the period !, whereas for !"# and !", their values are drawn from the 10-day average in each 
period. 
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5.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 8 provides the summary statistics of all the main variables involved in the 
regression analysis. The mean of the IV skew in the sample is 1.87, which implies that a one 
percent decrease in the strike price of a Put option (equivalent to saying that the contract is one 
percent more OTM) is on average associated with a 1.87 percent increase in implied volatility. 
The average change of skew measure is 0.15, indicating that we often see an increase in volatility 
skew during the sample period. The mean of the VPIN of OTM contracts is 0.15 greater than 
ATM contracts. The historical volatility of underlying stock has a mean of 0.48, and these 
equities experienced an average return of 0.02 or 2% over the sample period. The change in 
volatility has a mean of -0.01. The joint fact of a negative mean and a negatively skewed 
distribution seems to indicate that most volatility movements during the sample period are 
associated with the downside. Net demand pressure has a mean of -0.07, and the average relative 
liquidity ratio is -0.2. These numbers imply that in this sample, the selling pressure in the options 
market is higher than the purchasing pressure and that average OTM transaction volume is 
smaller than ATM volume, respectively.  
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Table 8. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the filtered sample from Implied Volatility Skew estimation. IV Skew is 
calculated using mid-point of open bid-ask prices of the two contracts with most extreme strike prices. VPIN 
difference (!"#$%&'') is obtained from OTM VPIN minus ATM VPIN. Historical volatility is the annualized 
volatility of each underlying stock. The value of underlying stock’s return is determined by its cumulative returns 
over the period !, whereas for !"# and !", their values are drawn from the 10-day average in each period. 
  Mean Std Skew Kurt Min Max 
IV Skew 1.87 1.54 6.59 74.96 -3.28 18.42 
Change in Skew (!!"#$) 0.15 1.27 5.86 52.76 -2.79 12.16 
VPIN difference (!"#$%&'') 0.15 0.11 -0.51 2.89 -0.21 0.37 
Historical Volatility 0.48 0.16 1.25 5.61 0.22 1.25 
Change in Volatility (!!!!"#) -0.01 0.03 -7.40 64.84 -0.27 0.02 
Stock Return (SR) 0.02 0.06 1.07 5.70 -0.13 0.24 
Net Demand (ND) -0.07 0.22 -0.19 3.72 -0.74 0.66 
Relative Net Demand (RND) -0.03 0.20 -0.02 3.80 -0.87 0.51 
Relative Liquidity Ratio (RL) -0.20 0.14 0.07 3.42 -0.55 0.25 
 
5.5 Results 
In order to investigate the effect of volatility information risk and the difference of which 
across strike prices on the shape and dynamics of implied volatility skew, I use simple OLS to 
estimate equation (38). The overall results are quite conclusive: the relative information 
asymmetry appears to play an important role in determining the skewness of implied volatility in 
the options market. Table 9 presents these results in five columns with variations in control 
variables. In column (1), the estimated coefficient for change in information risk difference 
between OTM and ATM contracts (!"#$%&'(() is positive and significant at 1% level. This is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction and the hypothesis that a higher discrepancy in 
volatility information risk between OTM and ATM contracts will lead to a greater implied 
volatility skewness level. As discussed previously, the impact of volatility information risk 
(measured by VPIN) differentials across moneyness on option IV skewness could be a result of 
changes in demand pressure or relative liquidity under certain circumstances. To take these 
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scenarios into consideration when investigating the role of heterogeneity in information 
asymmetry, different combinations of the three control variables—Net Demand, Relative Net 
Demand, and Relative Liquidity—are included in the regressions; their results are shown in 
columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 9. The only significant estimate is the coefficient for RL, 
which as expected has a positive sign and is different from zero at 10% significant level. Yet in 
all three columns, the results show that neither has much affected the economic nor statistical 
significance of the !!"#$%&'' coefficient.   
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Another insight from this dissertation is that the non-symmetric structure of information 
asymmetry between OTM and ATM contracts plays a critical role in deciding the degree to 
which a change in volatility uncertainty affects the shape of the implied volatility smile. To 
explore this hypothesis, an interactive term that measures the difference in VPIN between the 
OTM and ATM contracts, !"#$%&!!, is included in all regressions. I find that regardless of the 
control variables in use, columns (1) to (5) unanimously demonstrate a positive and highly 
significant estimate for the coefficient of !"#$%&'' ! !!!"#$, providing strong evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis. Moreover, it is very interesting to jointly interpret the estimates for !!!!"# and 
Table 9. Volatility Information Risk and IV Skew 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
!!"#$ !!"#$ !!"#$ !!"#$ !!"#$ 
            
!!!"#$ -34.31** -34.39** -34.35** -33.48** -33.63** 
 (-11.95) (-12.00) (-12.01) (-11.61) (-11.68) 
!"#$%&'! ! !!!"#$ 219.4** 219.9** 222.3** 216.6** 219.4** 
 (8.005) (8.039) (8.122) (7.936) (8.045) 
!!"#$%&'' 3.500** 3.316** 3.561** 3.196** 3.267** 
 (3.164) (2.980) (3.229) (2.868) (2.909) 
SR  1.634   0.831 
  (1.335)   (0.657) 
ND   0.469  0.481 
   (1.540)  (1.420) 
RND    -0.268 -0.0226 
    (-0.767) (-0.0595) 
RL    0.853* 0.920* 
    (1.787) (1.869) 
Constant 0.0809 0.0401 0.118 0.240* 0.277* 
 (1.097) (0.503) (1.527) (2.003) (1.987) 
      
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 
R-squared 0.460 0.465 0.467 0.470 0.481 
This table reports the regression results of average implied volatility skew from January 2003 to June 2003. The 
dependent variable is average implied volatility skew of selected stocks quoted on the CBOE over an interval of 10 
days. !!!"#$ is the annualized historical volatility of each underlying stock. !!"#$%&'' is the change of difference in 
VPIN, which is calculated using OTM VPIN minus ATM VPIN of the same underlying stock. SR is the cumulative 
stock return over the same interval. ND is the average Net Demand by non-market makers. RND and RL are 
estimates of Relative Net Demand and Relative Liquidity between OTM contracts and ATM contracts. During the 
sample period. T-statistics are shown in parentheses; the significance level of coefficients is shown according to 
criteria: ** p<0.01, * p<0.1. 
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!"#$%&'' ! !!!!"#. For example, if we look at the results in column (5), the estimate for !!!!"# 
and !"#$%&'' ! !!!!"# is -33.63 and 219.4, respectively. This implies that if the historical 
volatility of a stock increases and the level of information asymmetry is identical across strike 
prices, then the slope of the IV smile will actually decrease. However, if we pick the average 
stock in the sample, which has !"#$%&'' of 0.15 (i.e., OTM contracts have more volatility 
information risk than ATM contracts), then the net effect on the IV skew approximately equals 
33.63+0.15*219.4=-0.72—very close to zero in net effect. If we select another stock whose 
excess information risk in OTM contract verses ATM contract is greater than average, an 
increase in historical volatility may actually increase the implied volatility skew in the options 
market. These results suggest that the structure of information asymmetry not only affects how 
changes in volatility uncertainty affect implied volatility skew, it even has the ability to change 
the direction of this effect should the volatility information risk be significantly higher in OTM 
contracts than ATM contracts. These findings are also consistent with the intuition behind the 
theoretical framework. Recall that in equation (17) from Chapter 2 that the equilibrium option 
price is the expected value of options, given their prices in either volatility states. An increase of 
volatility uncertainty increases the option values in both states. However, in addition to the non-
linearity between option value and volatility in the conditional Black-Scholes formula, a higher 
information risk in OTM also implies that a larger portion of increase in option value from the 
High volatility state is carried into the present price than the portion from the Low volatility 
state.29 As a result, it is possible that given a large information risk differential, an increase in 
                                                
&<!=>!?3@8A0B!5C0A0!A5450,0D5A!480!,410!@D108!5C0!4AA@,-5/3DA!5C45!E3.45/./56!@D?0854/D56!/A!4!./D048!>@D?5/3D!3>!
C/A538/?4.!E3.45/./56!4D1!5C0!?3D1/5/3D4.!FG7!>38,@.4!/A!5C0!?3880?5!3-5/3D!-8/?/DH!>38,@.4!4>508!58@0!E3.45/./56!/A!80E04.01#!
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historical volatility may actually increase the implied volatility skew, as shown in Figure 14. 
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I develop a new model using an asymmetric information framework 
to study the behavior of volatility information traders in option markets. The theory confirms that 
leverage, liquidity, and transaction cost are important factors that influence informed investor’s 
investment strategies. By allowing traders to simultaneously select multiple option contracts, I 
show that as they attempt to balance the tradeoffs between various factors, OTM option contracts 
will contain higher information risk as an equilibrium outcome.  
I also carefully establish a relationship between volatility information trading and option 
prices. I show that the potential heterogeneity in information asymmetry across option strikes is 
an important contributor to the observed spread structure in option markets and that OTM 
contracts tend to have larger spreads. In addition, I expand the current understanding of the role 
of information asymmetry in the implied volatility skew by making a connection with the 
behavior of volatility traders. Because the degree of heterogeneity in information risk within the 
same option series may vary from case to case as market condition changes, I show that a higher 
difference in information risk across strikes will result in a greater slope of implied volatility 
skew. 
In addition to providing a theoretical foundation for existing empirical studies, I also 
include a number of tests on the implication of the theoretical model developed in this 
dissertation. Using several datasets, including two proprietary ones from the Chicago Board 
Option Exchange (CBOE), I am able to estimate the VPIN variable for the US equity option 
market, and provide evidence that OTM option contracts on average, have a higher probability of 
information trading than ATM option contracts. I also show that volatility information risk 
accounts for a considerable proportion in explaining the empirical spread structure in the US 
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equity option market. Furthermore, in the last chapter, I provide new evidence that differences in 
information asymmetry within the same option series not only help to directly explain the 
dynamics of implied volatility skew; they also play a central role in determining the degree to 
which changes in volatility affect the dynamics of implied volatility skew. 
Finally, I believe it will be very interesting for future research to improve and expand the 
content of this dissertation in a number of ways. I would love to explore an extension of the 
theory for a different or more complex economy. Doing so could generate some fascinating 
implications that would allow us to empirically study and compare the effect of volatility 
information trading on other types of option markets, from interest rates to foreign exchanges. It 
would also be beneficial to the understanding of this literature if the idea of the theoretical model 
could be applied in a dynamic setting, which would help address numerous questions that this 
static model is not able to systematically answer. 
  101 
Appendix 
Notations in Appendix: !! ! ! !!!!!!! !!! 
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Proof for Proposition 1.1 
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Proof for Proposition 1.2 
Informed investor will invest everything into i-contract if !!! ! !  
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Proof for Proposition 1.3 and 1.4 
Comparative Statics: 
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Proof for Proposition 1.5 
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Proof for Proposition 2.1: 
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The relationship between PIN and !"! ! !"# : 
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Solve for Bid-price: 
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List of equity options in empirical investigation 
 
Symbols of Underlying Stock in the Option Dataset 
AIG DELL IBM NOK WMB 
AMAT DRYR INTC NXTL WMT 
AMGN EBAY JNJ ORCL XMSR 
AMZN EMC JPM PFE XOM 
AOL EP KLAC QCOM YHOO 
BAC F KO RX 
 BSX GE MMM S 
 C GM MO TXN 
 CPN HD MRK TYC 
 CSCO HPQ MSFT UPS   
 
 
VPIN Estimation under different parameter combinations 
 
Average VPIN under Different Parameter Combinations (V=avg daily 
volume) 
OTM Puts ATM Puts ATM Calls OTM Calls Parameter Choice 
0.775 0.659 0.556 0.686 V/2, 30 
0.776 0.659 0.556 0.686 V/2, 35 
0.776 0.659 0.556 0.686 V/2, 40 
0.702 0.578 0.470 0.606 V, 30 
0.703 0.577 0.470 0.606 V, 35 
0.703 0.577 0.470 0.607 V, 40 
0.662 0.520 0.415 0.555 1.5V, 30 
0.662 0.520 0.416 0.557 1.5V, 35 
0.662 0.520 0.416 0.557 1.5V, 40 
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(M&#!
F450AB!U4E/1!7#!KS0A5/DH!3-5/3D!-8/?/DH!,310.A#K!@-,?A))%#)/#>6-61$612$B!%<<)#!
F/4/AB!F8@D3B!4D1!T/0880!Z/../3D#!K+DA/108!4D1!./[@/1/56!5841/DH!/D!A53?9!4D1!3-5/3DA!
,48905A#K!;&=1&'#)/#01,-,21-.#>6*?1&$B!%<<(#!
F36.0B!TC0./,!T#B!4D1!S3D!238A5#!K=-5/3D!80-./?45/3D!/D!1/A?8050!5/,0!X/5C!584DA4?5/3D!?3A5A#K!
B<&#()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!D3#!(M!:%<<&;L!&M%G&<'#!
F3..0DB!W/?C3.4A!T#B!4D1!\3]085!V#!IC4.06#!KU30A!D05!]@6/DH!-80AA@80!4>>0?5!5C0!AC4-0!3>!
/,-./01!E3.45/./56!>@D?5/3DA^K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!&""(#!
F80DD4DB!Q/?C40.!J#B!4D1!Z#!Z0D86!P43#!K+D>38,45/3DB!58410B!4D1!108/E45/E0!A0?@8/5/0A#K!
;&=1&'#)/#01,-,21-.#>6*?1&$B!%<<)L!%)'G&"*#!
P43B!P#B!_#!PC0DB!4D1!J#!Q#!`8/>>/D#!K+D>38,45/3D4.!P3D50D5!3>!=-5/3D!23.@,0!T8/38!53!S490G
3E08A#K!()*+,-.#)/#C*$1,&$$B!D3#!M*!:&""$;L!%"M'G%%"<#!
PC4984E4856B!7#B!Z#!`@.0DB!4D1!7#!Q46C0X#!K+D>38,01!5841/DH!/D!A53?9!4D1!3-5/3D!,48905A#K!
()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!&""$#!
PC4DB!O#B!a#T#!PC@DHB!4D1!I#Q#!b3DH#!KSC0!+D>38,45/3D4.!\3.0!3>!753?9!4D1!=-5/3D!23.@,0#K!
;&=1&'#)/#01,-,21-.#>6*?1&$!%$B!D3#!(!:&""&;L!%"(<G%"M$#!
PC08/4DB!J3A0-C!N#B!4D1!\3]085!N#!J4883X#!K=-5/3D!,48905AB!A0.>G>@.>/../DH!-83>-C0?/0AB!4D1!
/,-./01!E3.45/./5/0A#K!;&=1&'#)/#D&+1=-61=&$#;&$&-+2<B!%<<*#!
V4A.06B!U4E/1!N#B!4D1!Q4@800D!=cZ484#!KT8/?0B!58410!A/d0B!4D1!/D>38,45/3D!/D!A0?@8/5/0A!
,49805A#K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,-21-.#32),)412$B!%<*M#!
V4A.06B!U4E/1B!W/?C3.4A!O/0>08B!4D1!Q4@800D!=cZ484#!KP804,GA9/,,/DH!38!-83>/5!AC48/DH^!
SC0!?@8/3@A!83.0!3>!-@8?C4A01!38108!>.3X!#K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!%<<)L!*%%G*''#!
V4A.06B!U4E/1B!W/?C3.4A!O/0>08B!4D1!Q4@800D!=cZ484#!K=D0!146!/D!5C0!./>0!3>!4!E086!?3,,3D!
A53?9!#K!;&=1&'#)/#01,-,21-.#>6*?1&$B!%<<ML!*"$G*'$#!
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V4A.06B!U4E/1B!Q4@800D!=cZ484B!4D1!T#7#!78/D/E4A#!K=-5/3DA!E3.@,0!4D1!A53?9!-8/?0AL!
0E/10D?0!3D!XC080!/D>38,01!584108A!58410#K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!%<<*#!
`.3A50DB!R4X80D?0!\#B!4D1!T4@.!\#!Q/.H83,#!KF/1B!4A9!4D1!584DA4?5/3D!-8/?0A!/D!4!A-0?/4./A5!
,48905!X/5C!C05083H0D3@A.6!/D>38,01!584108A#K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,21-.#32),)412$B!%<*$#!
Z@..B!J3CDB!4D1!N.4D!IC/50#!KSC0!-8/?/DH!3>!3-5/3DA!3D!4AA05A!X/5C!A53?C4A5/?!E3.45/./5/0A#K!
()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!%<*M#!
Z3B!SC3,4A!7aB!4D1!Z4DA!\#!753..#!KSC0!16D4,/?A!3>!104.08!,48905A!@D108!?3,-05/5/3D#K!B<&#
()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&!'*B!D3#!(!:%<*';L!%"$'G%"M(#!
J4,0A3DB!Q#B!4D1!I#!I/.C0.,#!KQ48905!,49/DH!/D!5C0!3-5/3D!,48905!4D1!5C0!?3A5A!3>!
1/A?8050!C01H0!80]4.4D?/DH#K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!%<<&#!
O6.0B!N.]085!7#!KP3D5/D@3@A!4@?5/3DA!4D1!/DA/108!5841/DH#K!32),)4&6+12-B!%<*$L!%'%$G%'')#!
O4@.B!`4@8,4DB!4D1!Q4C0D18484e4C#!K+D>38,45/3D!5841/DH!4D1!3-5/3D!A-8041A#K!E)+%1,:#
F-7&+B!&""(#!
R00B!PC48.0AB!4D1!Q489!J#!\0416#!K+D>088/DH!58410!1/80?5/3D!>83,!/D584146!1454#K!B<&#()*+,-.#
)/#01,-,2&B!D3#!&!:%<<%;L!M''GM()#!
R0.4D1B!Z46D0!V#!K=-5/3D!-8/?/DH!4D1!80-./?45/3D!X/5C!584DA4?5/3DA!?3A5A#K!B<&#G)*+,-.#)/#
/1,-,2&!("B!D3#!$!:%<*$;L!%&*'G%'"%#!
W450D]08HB!7C0.13DB!7?355!+8X/DB!Q0/AD08!J4,0AB!4D1!F36.0!TC0./,#!KT4D0.L!\0A048?C!
U/80?5/3DA!/D!P3,,31/56!=-5/3DAfN?410,/?!4D1!T84?5/5/3D08!2/0XA!#K!;&=1&'#)/#0*6*+&$#
H-+%&6$B!%<<"L!%'(G%$$#!
W/B!73-C/0!g#B!J@D!T4DB!4D1!N..0D!Q#!T350AC,4D#!K23.45/./56!/D>38,45/3D!5841/DH!/D!5C0!3-5/3D!
,48905#K!()*+,-.#)/#01,-,2&B!&""*L!%"$<G%"<%#!
T4DB!J@DB!4D1!N..0D!Q#!T350AC,4D#!KSC0!/D>38,45/3D!/D!3-5/3D!E3.@,0!>38!>@5@80!A53?9!
-8/?0A#K!;&=1&'#)/#01,-,21-.#>6*?1&$B!&"")L!%%MY%("#!
750/DB!V./4A!Q#B!4D1!J080,6!P#!750/D#!K753?9!-8/?0!1/A58/]@5/3DA!X/5C!A53?C4A5/?!E3.45/./56L!4D!
4D4.65/?!4--834?C#K!;&=1&'#)/#01,-,21-.#>6*?1&$B!%<<%#!
 
 
 
 
 
